Varieties of alethic pluralism (and why alethic disjunctivism is relatively compelling)*

Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen  
*University of Copenhagen*

Cory D. Wright  
*California State University, Long Beach*

Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section 2 presents a distinction between strong and moderate versions of monism and pluralism, understood as theses about the existence of truth properties. Section 3 introduces four pluralist positions: strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism and manifestation functionalism. These positions are classified using the basic framework from Section 2, and a further distinction between pure and mixed versions of pluralism is drawn. Interestingly, alethic disjunctivism and the two kinds of functionalism—i.e. three out of four positions—have a mixed character. They incorporate a monist thesis. The only pure form of pluralism is strong alethic pluralism. Section 4 adds another distinction to the stock: one-level and two-level views. Each of the mixed positions operates with two levels, locating certain “alethically potent”—or grounding—properties at a lower level and others at a higher level. We briefly discuss the nature of grounding. In Section 5, we answer a question about mixed, two-level views, viz. whether they are as much monist as pluralist in nature, or more. They are not. Section 6 is devoted to the task of arguing that the strong pluralist, the second-order functionalist, and the manifestation functionalist will find it hard to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism.

1. Monism vs. pluralism

Traditional views on truth include the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and what one might label “Peircean pragmatism”. According to the correspondence theorist, truth is correspondence to fact, while, for the coherence theorist and the Peircean pragmatist, truth is respectively coherence with some specified set of propositions or beliefs and agreement at the end of (scientific) enquiry. More views could be added to the list. Also, it is possible to distinguish between different versions of the views. For the purposes of this paper, however, what is important to note is that “traditionalism” has often been combined with monism about truth. According to the monist, there is exactly one truth property (correspondence, coherence, agreement at the end of enquiry, etc.), and it is in terms of this property that truth is to be accounted for across all truth-apt discourse. The correspondence monist thus has it that truth always consists in correspondence with fact, regardless of whether we are dealing with mathematical truth (“2^2 + 5^2 = 33”), physical truth (“Electrons have negative charge”), or moral truth (“Killing innocent people is wrong”). Other monists tell the same kind of story,
although, of course, they switch the focus from correspondence to coherence, agreement at the end of enquiry, or whatever their favoured truth candidate is.¹

Monism meets opposition from two camps. One is deflationism, the other pluralism. According to the deflationist, monism is misguided at a very fundamental level. It is a core commitment of the view that truth has an underlying, substantive nature that it makes sense to subject to philosophical analysis and that may go beyond our concept of it. The deflationist rejects this commitment. Truth has no underlying, or deep, nature. If anything, it has an extremely transparent nature. All there is to say about truth is captured by the Disquotational Schema: “p” is true if and only if p.² Pluralists typically agree with the monist that truth has an underlying, substantive nature. Truth is approached from a substantivist, inflationary point of view.³ Thus, the monist’s mistake is not that she takes correspondence, coherence, or agreement at the end of enquiry to be legitimate objects of study in account for the nature of truth. Instead her mistake lies with the assumption that studying one of these properties will exhaust what there is to say about truth.

According to pluralists, no single truth property can cover all there is to say about truth-apt discourse. While specific truth properties may be plausible candidate truth properties for certain domains, each of them falters when it comes to others. It might be that truths about concrete objects can plausibly be accounted for in terms of correspondence to facts, but correspondence appears much less viable when it comes to accounting for moral truth, say. In other words, the scope of the correspondence theory is not wide enough. The same point applies to other traditional views.⁴ For this reason, the pluralist holds that there are several truth properties—including, potentially, correspondence, coherence, and agreement at the end of enquiry. The guiding thought behind the rejection of monism is that subject-matter matters, at least as far as truth is concerned. The subject-matter of a given proposition determines which property, among a plurality of properties, is the one in terms of which its truth is assessed (assuming that it is truth-apt).

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section 2 presents a distinction between strong and moderate versions of monism and pluralism, understood as theses about the existence of truth properties. Section 3 introduces four pluralist positions: strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism and manifestation functionalism. These positions are classified using the basic framework from Section 2, and a further distinction between pure and mixed versions of pluralism is drawn. Interestingly, alethic disjunctivism and the two kinds of functionalism—i.e. three out of four positions—have a mixed character. They incorporate a monist thesis. The only pure form of pluralism is strong alethic pluralism.

¹ Some people deny that there is such a thing as moral truth—i.e. deny that propositions pertaining to these subject-matters are truth-apt. This is something that the monist can happily grant. Monism is not the view that all discourse is truth-apt, but rather that all discourse, if truth-apt, is so in the same way. The examples of truth-apt discourse given were used for the sake of illustration and not meant to suggest that the monist is committed to the truth-aptitude of the specific kinds of discourse mentioned.

² Prominent deflationists include Paul Horwich and Hartry Field. See Horwich (1990) and Field (2001) for details of their specific brands of deflationism.

³ But see JC Beall’s contribution to this volume for an example of a deflationary pluralist.

⁴ This consideration against monism has been referred to as the “Scope Problem” by Lynch (2004, p. 385) and the “problem of the common denominator” by Sher (1998, pp. 133–34). See also Chapter 1 of Wright (1992). For a critical discussion of the significance attributed to the Scope Problem by pluralists, see Dodd’s contribution to this volume. He argues that it fails to give pluralism any leverage over deflationism.
Section 4 adds another distinction to the stock: one-level and two-level views. Each of the mixed positions operates with two levels, locating certain “alethically potent”—or grounding—properties at a lower level and others at a higher level. We briefly discuss the nature of grounding. In Section 5, we answer a question about mixed, two-level views, viz. whether they are as much monist as pluralist in nature, or more. They are not. Section 6 is devoted to the task of arguing that the strong pluralist, the second-order functionalist, and the manifestation functionalist will find it hard to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism.

2. Strong and moderate pluralism

In this section, we will do some stage setting by distinguishing between two kinds of respectively monism and pluralism, understood as theses about the existence of truth properties.\(^5\) In the next section we will use these various theses classify four positions that have been presented under the label “pluralism” in the literature.

Turning first to monism, let us distinguish between the following two kinds:

(Strong monism) There is exactly one truth property, and it is possessed by all true propositions.

(Moderate monism) There is a truth property, and it is possessed by all true propositions.

Anyone who endorses strong monism is also thereby committed to moderate monism, but endorsing moderate monism does not by itself commit one to strong monism.

Likewise let us distinguish between two kinds of pluralism:

(Strong pluralism) There is more than one truth property, and no truth property is possessed by all true propositions.

(Moderate pluralism) There is more than one truth property.

As in the case of monism, the strong version brings on a commitment to its moderate counterpart, but not \textit{vice versa}.

Strong monism is incompatible with both versions of pluralism. If there is exactly one truth property, there cannot be more than one truth property—but that is part of what both strong pluralism and moderate pluralism say. Strong pluralism bears the same relation to both versions of monism, i.e. one of incompatibility. If there is no truth property shared by all true propositions—a \textit{generic truth property}—there can be no truth property that all true propositions possess. But that is part of what the two versions of monism say. Matters are different when we turn to the moderate versions of the two views. While moderate monism is incompatible with strong pluralism and moderate pluralism with strong monism, the two moderate theses are compatible. The explanation is that the generic truth property to which the moderate monist is committed could be one among the several truth properties to which the moderate pluralist is committed.

3. Four kinds of pluralism

\(^5\) Pedersen (2006) and (2010).
In this section we will familiarize ourselves with four pluralist positions from the literature. Before we get to the presentation of the views themselves, we will dwell briefly on methodology.

3.1 Methodological common ground: concept delineation via platitudes/truisms

Many pluralists converge on a certain methodological approach to the conceptual analysis of truth. They agree that the way to pin down or characterize the truth concept goes through a collection of salient principles—*platitudes* (Wright’s term, 1992) or *truisms* (Lynch’s term, 2009). These principles are meant to capture core features of the truth concept by connecting it to other concepts. There are differences among pluralists as to what specific principles should be salient in the delineation of the truth concept. However, we will list the principles favoured by Lynch for the sake of illustration (and it will also come in handy in Sect. 6.3).

Lynch’s favoured principles—his truisms—are the following three principles:

*Objectivity:* For every proposition $p$, $p$ is true if and only if, were $p$ to be believed, things would be believed to be as they are.

*Norm of Belief:* For every proposition $p$, it is prima facie correct to believe $p$ if and only if $p$ is true.

*End of Inquiry:* For every proposition $p$, other things being equal, if $p$ is true, then believing $p$ is a worthy goal of inquiry.

For Lynch, Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry are non-negotiable in the sense that if anything is to be a theory of truth—as opposed to a theory of something else—then it has to include these three principles. Pluralists who take other principles to be the ones that are salient to delineating the truth concept would say something similar about the principles they favour.

3.2 Strong alethic pluralism

The strong alethic pluralist believes that there is one truth concept, delineated by a set of salient truisms or platitudes. However, there are several truth properties, and no truth property is shared by all true propositions. The plurality of truth properties might include one or more among the following candidates: correspondence, coherence, superassertability, and concordance. What specific truth property a proposition has, if true, depends on what domain it belongs to.

---

6 See Lynch (2009: 8, 10, 12). It should be noted that Lynch states Objectivity and End of Inquiry in terms of beliefs, while Norm of Belief is put in terms of propositions—which, according to Lynch, is the primary truth-bearer (2009: 129-132). It should also be noted that Lynch states Objectivity and Norm of Belief as schemas while End of Inquiry has the form of a universal generalizations. Here we adopt the regimented formulation provided in by Marian David in his contribution to this volume.

7 Lynch (2009), p. 17.

8 Wright (1992) presents superassertability as an epistemically constrained notion of truth more promising than notions advocated by Putnam (being true is to be justified under ideal circumstances, cf. 1981) and Peirce. A statement is “superassertable ... if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information.” (Wright 1992:48). Lynch (2009) presents concordance as a candidate for truth in the moral domain. Concordance involves elements from the coherence theory and, like Wright’s notion of superassertability, relies on the idea of improvement (2009: 164-80).
Strong alethic pluralists reject the thesis that there is any truth property shared by every proposition that has one of the domain-specific truth properties. This is why they are all strong pluralists. Some contributors to the debate—one of the authors included—have expressed sympathy for strong pluralism in the abstract, i.e. without committing to a definite range of specific truth properties.\footnote{Pedersen (2006). Some people read Wright as a strong pluralist. Now, it is pretty clear that he is a moderate pluralist, i.e. someone who buys into a plurality of truth properties (Wright (1992), pp. 141-43; (2001), pp. 752-53). Given his endorsement of moderate pluralism, strong pluralism can be attributed to him only if he rejects the existence of a generic truth property. Lynch (2006, Sect. 3; Lynch 2009, pp. 59-62) attributes such a rejection to Wright on the basis of his earlier work. We do not think that his earlier work includes enough detail to decide one way or the other. For Wright’s most recent take on pluralism, cf. his contribution to this volume. What has been labeled “strong alethic pluralism” here should not be conflated with what Lynch has referred to as “simple alethic pluralism” (2006, Sect. 2; 2009, pp. 54-55). Simple alethic pluralism is the view that there are several truth concepts. This is different from saying that there are several truth properties. Although, as just indicated, we find Lynch’s attribution of strong pluralism to Wright too swift, we agree with Lynch’s take on Wright when it comes to truth concepts. Wright is not a simple alethic pluralist—indeed, he says so explicitly himself (Wright 1996, p. 924) in response to critics who read him in precisely that way (Pettit 1996, Sainsbury 1996). Someone who is attracted to this kind of pluralism about truth concepts is Max Köbel (cf. 2008, forthcoming).} One reason why pluralists, whether moderate or strong, might refrain from committing to a definite range of specific truth properties is fairly trivial. It might simply be that they have not yet considered the issue what truth consists in for all truth-apt domains. Although they have specific candidates in mind for certain domains, it may be that they have no specific candidate—or perhaps only a range of candidates—in mind for other domains. Even if the pluralist has considered candidate properties for all truth-apt domains, it might be that she is hesitant to commit to a definite range of specific truth properties. For, as Wright has said, it might not be transparent what truth consists in for certain domains. Figuring out could be a matter of further conceptual reflection.\footnote{Wright (2001), p. 753. The pluralist is committed to thinking that there is a definite range of specific truth properties. What we are suggesting is that pluralists may refrain from giving any specification of truth properties that makes a claim to being complete or final, because they are not in a position that warrants a specification of this kind.} We take it that this potential indefiniteness about what specific truth properties the pluralist commits to should not detract from the interest in the proposal. The interest in pluralism derives from the idea characteristic of it, viz. that there is a plurality of truth properties, rather than from commitments as to what specific properties might be in the plurality.

3.3 Alethic disjunctivism

The alethic disjunctivist is a moderate pluralist. There are several domain-specific truth properties $T_1, \ldots, T_n$. The alethic disjunctivist is also a moderate monist, as her position incorporates the thesis that there is a generic truth property $T_G$, characterized as follows:

$$\text{(TG)} \quad (\forall p)(T_G(p) \leftrightarrow (T_1(p) \land \text{domain}_1(p)) \lor \ldots \lor (T_n(p) \land \text{domain}_n(p)))$$

i.e. a proposition is generically true just in case it possesses the truth property of domain$_1$ and belongs to domain$_1$, possesses the truth property of domain$_n$ and belongs to domain$_n$, or ... or it possesses the truth property of domain$_n$ and belongs to domain$_n$.

It should be pretty clear that the talk of domains in the right-hand side of the biconditional is essential to capturing one of the core thoughts behind pluralism, viz. that truth properties are truth properties relative to a domain (the generic, disjunctive property being the only exception—it applies across the board). Thus, it is not enough for the truth of a given proposition (whether generic or domain-specific) that it has a property that is the truth property of some domain. It needs to be the truth property of
the particular domain to which the proposition belongs. To illustrate, suppose that corresponding with reality is the truth property for domain_1, and that superassertibility is so for domain_2. Consider now a proposition \( p \) that belongs to domain_1, and is superassertible, but does not correspond. Is \( p \) true? No. It does not have the truth property of domain_1, i.e. correspondence, and so, it is neither domain-specifically true nor generically true. Granted, \( p \) is superassertible, and so, has a property that is the truth property of some domain. But the point is that this is a domain other than the one to which it belongs. Now, precisely because it is pretty clear that the talk of domains is strictly speaking needed, we will often allow ourselves to leave it implicit (as done in Pedersen (2010)). Thus, e.g., we will allow ourselves to talk about a proposition’s being generically true in virtue of corresponding to reality without somewhat tediously adding that correspondence is the truth property for the domain to which the proposition belongs.\(^{11}\)

In Sect. 6, we will argue that alethic disjunctivism is relatively compelling. By this we mean that there is considerable pressure on adherents of the three other kinds of pluralism to embrace alethic disjunctivism.\(^{12}\)

3.4 Second-order functionalism

The key characteristic of alethic functionalism is that the truth concept is best characterized by looking at its function. We do so by looking at the role that truth plays in the cognitive economy of ordinary folk. That is, we look for widely—although perhaps tacitly—endorsed principles that link truth to other concepts.\(^{13}\) Let us refer to the principles that delineate the truth concept as the “salient principles” (so as to avoid conflation with Lynch’s truisms, i.e. the specific principles that he favours).

By reference to the salient principles it can be specified what it means for a property to play the truth-role relative to a given domain:

\[
\text{(TR) } \text{For any property } F, F \text{ plays the truth-role relative to domain, if and only if, for every proposition } p \text{ in domain, } F \text{ satisfies the salient principles for } p.
\]

In turn, (TR) puts us in a position to provide a functionalist characterization of the conditions under which a proposition is true (Lynch 2001b, 2004, 2006—but with one crucial difference; see the footnote at the end of the section):

\(^{11}\) Edwards (ms) attributes what he refers to as “simple alethic disjunctivism” to Pedersen (2010) and goes on to criticize the view. Simple alethic disjunctivism is alethic disjunctivism minus the domain conjuncts of the right-hand side of (TG). Edwards goes on to suggest that simple alethic disjunctivism should be amended by adding the domain conjuncts. These conjuncts were left implicit in Pedersen (2010), and so, on a quite superficial reading simple alethic disjunctivism might seem attributable to Pedersen (2010). Nonetheless, it is pretty clear that alethic disjunctivism—domain conjuncts and all—is the kind of disjunctivism envisioned in the paper. The statement of disjunctivism is immediately preceded by “There are, as it were, several ways in which statements can be true, and for a given statement \( p \), the way in which \( p \) is true (if it is true) depends on its specific domain. For instance, if the statement concerns pebbles or other ordinary concrete entities, it is presumably true in virtue of corresponding with reality” (p. 94). This passage makes it clear that statements are true (if true) because they possess a specific property that make statements of their particular kind true, as opposed to possessing some property or other. Furthermore, if simple alethic disjunctivism were attributable to Pedersen, it would be difficult to make sense of the idea that there are domain-specific truth properties. If the disjunct properties are “alethically potent” with respect to any proposition whatsoever (provided that it is truth-apt), it is difficult to sustain the division of propositions into domains whose members are true in virtue of possessing a truth property specific to their domain. However, the disjunct properties are explicitly referred to as being domain-specific.

\(^{12}\) For more on alethic disjunctivism, see Pedersen (2006—against) and (2010—for). For other sympathizers, see Cotnoir (2009, p. 372) and Edwards (ms). Lynch (2009, p. 66-67) criticizes the view.

(FTC) For every proposition \( p \), \( p \) is true if and only if \( p \) has the property that plays the truth-role for the domain to which \( p \) belongs.

According to the second-order functionalist, (FTC) points us directly to what truth—considered as a property—is. It is a certain second-order property, the role-property (Lynch 2001b, 2004, 2006):

\[(T^{2O})\] The property of being true is the property of having a property that plays the truth-role (relative to the relevant domain).

This characterization of second-order functionalism is schematic in one very crucial respect: it does not include a specification of what the salient principles are. For the sake of illustration (but not necessarily endorsement), let us just suppose that we are dealing with an alethic functionalist who takes Lynch's three truisms—Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry—as the principles that delineate the truth concept. Combined with (TR) this would give the following characterization of a property's playing the truth-role:

\[(TR^*)\] For any property \( F \), \( F \) plays the truth-role relative to domain, if and only if, for every proposition \( p \) in domain,

\[
\begin{align*}
(i) & \quad \text{\( p \) is \( F \) if and only if, were \( p \) to be believed, things would be believed to be as they are,} \\
(ii) & \quad \text{it is prima facie correct to believe \( p \) if and only if \( p \) is \( F \), and} \\
(iii) & \quad \text{other things being equal, if \( p \) is \( F \), then believing \( p \) is a worthy goal of inquiry.}
\end{align*}
\]

Whatever specific set of principles the second-order functionalist endorses, she will say that the properties that play the truth-role are realizer properties—in the jargon familiar from the philosophy of mind. About truth itself she will say that it is a second-order, multiply realizable property. (We will sometimes refer to it as “\( T^{2OF} \).”) \( T^{2OF} \) is a second-order property, because a proposition's having it is always grounded in the possession of a property in the set of realizer properties—i.e. a property that plays the truth-role for the domain to which the proposition belongs. \( T^{2OF} \) is a multiply realizable property, because different properties (correspondence, supercoherence, etc.) play the truth-role for different domains—and so, truth can be realized in different ways across domains.

Like the alethic disjunctivism, second-order alethic functionalism combines moderate pluralist and moderate monist. The view is moderately pluralist, because there are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This is because truth is multiply realizable. At the same time, it is precisely truth's multiple realizability that underwrites the moderately monist aspect of second-order functionalism: the second-order, multiply realizable property \( T^{2OF} \) is had by all true propositions.\(^{14}\)

\[^{14}\text{We have attributed second-order functionalism to Lynch (2001b), (2004), and (2006). Note that in these articles Lynch explicitly formulates the view by relying on Ramsification and by appealing to a different list of principles than the one we have just used for illustration. We have allowed ourselves to drop the reliance on Ramsification and to list different principles, because neither Ramsification nor a specific list of principles is needed to spell out second-order functionalism (although, of course, one can later add these elements). Nothing in the considerations and arguments to be offered later hangs on the differences in our presentation of second-order functionalism compared to Lynch's own presentation in (2001b), (2004), and (2006).}

\[^{14}\text{Another point: Lynch does not himself relativize the truth-role to domains, as we have done in the presentation of second-order functionalism. However, it seems to us that this needs to be done. The intended realizer properties—correspondence et al.—do not play the truth-role for all propositions. If the intended realizer properties did so, it would be difficult to maintain the idea that correspondence and the}
3.5 Manifestation functionalism

We now turn to a different brand of functionalism—what we will refer to as “manifestation functionalism”, for reasons to transpire below. This view shares substantial common ground with second-order functionalism. Like the second-order functionalist, the manifestation functionalist seeks to map the nature of truth by looking at the truth-role. She endorses (TR) and (F₁⁰) as specifications of respectively what it is for a property to play the truth-role and the conditions under which a proposition is true (Lynch 2009, pp. 70-73). In endorsing manifestation functionalism, Lynch adds detail to (TR) by adopting (TR'), i.e. he adopts Objectivity, Norm of Belief, and End of Inquiry as delineating the truth-role. However, when it comes to a characterization of the functionalist truth property, (T₂₀) of the second-order functionalist package has been replaced by:

(Tₘ) “The property being true (or the property of truth) is the property that has the truish features essentially or which plays the truth-role as such.” (2009, p. 74)

—also formulated as follows:

(Tₘᵣᵣ) The property being true is “the property that is, necessarily, had by believed contents just when things are as they are believed to be; had by propositions believed at the end of inquiry and which makes propositions correct to believe.” (Lynch this volume, p. 13 in ms.)

(Tₘ) and (Tₘᵣᵣ) make no reference to the realizer properties that feature so prominently in (T₂₀), i.e. in the characterization provided by the second-order functionalist. Instead truth is characterized directly as being the property that possesses the truish features essentially. In light of this, one might wonder what relationship properties like correspondence and superwarrant—i.e. the would-be realizer properties—bear to the truth property characterized by (Tₘ) or (Tₘᵣᵣ)?¹⁵ To shed light on this matter we need to look at what Lynch calls “manifestation” and “immanence”.

Manifestation, like realizability, is a metaphysical grounding relation. If a property M manifests a property I, something’s being I is grounded in its being M (for more on grounding, see Sect. 4). More precisely¹⁶:

(M) Property M manifests property I just in case it is a priori that the set of I’s conceptually essential features is a subset of M’s features.

(I) Property M manifests a property I just in case I is immanent in M.

From (M) it follows immediately that the manifestation relation is reflexive, because any set is a subset of itself. Conceptually essential features of a given property F are thought to (i) be part of the nominal essence of F, (ii) hold of F with conceptual necessity, and (iii) serve to distinguish F from other properties.

other realizer properties are alethically potent only locally. For, if they really did play the truth-role for all propositions, why shouldn’t they be capable of making propositions true, whatever their domain might be (assuming that it is a truth-apt one)? In saying these things, we draw on David’s contribution to this volume (Sect. IV). David urges Lynch to relativize the truth-role to domains. This is done in the context of a discussion of Lynch’s most recent version of alethic functionalism (to which we will turn in the following section). However, the point seems apt in the present setting—for the reason just given.

¹⁵ At least one of the authors finds the uniqueness claim involved in (Tₘ) problematic. For now we will grant the idea that (Tₘ) characterizes a unique truth property. However, for further discussion, see Sect. 6.3.

¹⁶ Lynch (2009), pp. 74-75.
(M) and (I) are presented as capturing a new kind of metaphysical grounding relation, distinct from, e.g., the determinable/determinate and genus/species distinctions.\textsuperscript{17} Let us turn to the case where the immanent property is truth. The thought is that correspondence et al. are \textit{truth-manifesting properties}, properties that manifest truth or in which truth is immanent. This is the relationship that truth, as characterized by (TM) and (T^MN), bears to the other properties of interest on the manifestation functionalist view. Following Lynch, one can intuitively think of manifestation and immanence along the following lines: if M manifests I (or I is immanent in M), part of being M is being I.\textsuperscript{18} With this idea in hand, we can think of being true as part of corresponding with reality, and similarly for other truth-manifesting properties.

Lynch relativizes manifestation to propositions. What specific property manifests truth for a given proposition depends on its subject-matter and its logical structure.\textsuperscript{19} Let us turn first to atomic propositions. Consider the following thesis stating a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of atomics:

\textbf{(T^CA)} For any atomic proposition \( p \), \( p \) is true if and only if \( p \) has the property \( M \) that manifests truth for \( p \) and is distinct from truth, where manifestation is understood as above.\textsuperscript{20} As noted, truth always manifests itself, because manifestation is reflexive. However, (T^CA) tells us that what matters for atomic propositions is that there is some \textit{further} truth-manifesting property that \( p \) has. In such cases we will say that the truth of \( p \) is \textit{strongly grounded}. (T^CA) tells us that atomic truths are exactly the strongly grounded truths—or, as Lynch would say, the \textit{unplain} truths.

The manifestation functionalist does not hold (T^CA) in full generality. Shapiro (forthcoming) argues that there are atomic, plain truths—truths that are atomic, but fail to be strongly grounded. Lynch agrees (see his contribution to this volume). In particular, truth-attributions such as “It is true that grass is green” are atomic and yet plainly true. Hence, they are not true in virtue of possessing some truth-manifesting property other than truth. For this reason there is no exact match between the atomic truths and the unplain truths. Still, Lynch seems sympathetic to the idea that even atomic, plain truths somehow depend on unplain truths. Thus, he takes the truth-value of “It is true that grass is green” to depend on the truth-value of “Grass is green”, an atomic, unplain truth.

What about compound, or complex, propositions? According to the manifestation functionalist, these propositions are \textit{plainly true}, where this is to be understood as follows:

\textbf{(T^C)} A proposition \( p \) is \textit{plainly true} just in case it is true and does not have any property distinct from truth that manifests truth for it.

To take an example, consider the conjunctive proposition \textit{Earth is spherical and }\( 2 + 2 = 4 \). This proposition is true. Suppose that correspondence is the truth-manifesting property for the first conjunct and coherence for the second one. The truth of both conjuncts is strongly grounded: they each have a property distinct from truth in virtue of which they are true. However, neither correspondence nor coherence manifests truth for the

\textsuperscript{17} Lynch (2009), p. 67 (genus/species), p. 75 (determinable/determinate).

\textsuperscript{18} Lynch (2009, p. 75), Lynch (this volume, p. 14 of ms.).

\textsuperscript{19} Lynch (2009, pp. 76-77), relativizes manifestation to domain, while in this volume Lynch relativizes manifestation to propositions. This suggestion has been made by David (this volume), among others.

\textsuperscript{20} As noted, as presented in Lynch (2009), manifestation functionalism is meant to be similar to second-order functionalism in several crucial respects. However, (T^C) marks a departure.
conjunction. Instead the conjunction is plainly true. The conjunction is true, and truth self-manifests, but the conjunction possesses no further truth-manifesting property.

We will return to plain and unplain truths in the next section.

3.5 Pure vs. mixed views

We have finished our brief presentation of the four pluralist views that will be discussed. It is noteworthy that only one view, strong pluralism, is a pure pluralist view. The other three views are of a mixed nature. In addition to incorporating moderate pluralism, alethic disjunctive, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism incorporate moderate monism. On each of these views, there is a truth property possessed by all true propositions. In due course (Sect. 6.1), we will argue that it is difficult to sustain pure pluralist positions—that, in effect, pure pluralist views collapse into alethic disjunctivism, i.e. a mixed view.

4. Levels and grounding

Strong alethic pluralism can be considered a one-level view, while alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism can be regarded as two-level views. Strong alethic pluralism is a one-level view in the sense that the truth properties that exist according to the view are all located at the same level. They are all properties that satisfy the plaititudes for specific domains, and relative to these domains, they are that in which trust consists. On the other hand, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism can be regarded as operating on two levels. According to alethic disjunctivism, at one level—the “lower” level—we find the disjunct properties. Additionally, at a “higher” level we have the generic disjunctive truth property, $T_G$. For second-order functionalism we have the realizer properties at the lower level and the second-order truth property, $T_{2OF}$, at the higher level. Finally, according to manifestation functionalism, the manifesting properties and immanent truth, $T_I$, occupy respectively the lower and higher levels.

This way of talking invites a layer-cake picture of the metaphysics of mixed pluralist views. It is an interesting issue how properties in the different layers, or at the different levels, relate. Lynch (2009) and Pedersen (2010) suggest that the metaphysical link between the lower-level and higher-level properties is a grounding relation, although they differ over the details (more below).

Let us dwell on the idea of metaphysical grounding for a bit. Just to be clear on terminology: we will use “$F(x)$ grounds $G(x)$” and “$G(x)$ in virtue of $F(x)$” interchangeably. Now, much has been written on metaphysical grounding. However, we will zoom in on just a few features—the ones that are relevant for present purposes.

First, we will take grounding to be (strongly) asymmetric, i.e.

(S-asymmetry) \[ \text{For all } x, \text{ if } F(x) \text{ grounds } G(x), \text{ then it is not the case that } G(x) \text{ grounds } F(x). \]

Second, we will also take grounding to be irreflexive, i.e.

(Irreflexitivity) \[ \text{For all } x, \text{ it is not the case that } F(x) \text{ grounds } F(x). \]

We take these two features to underwrite certain because-claims. If $F(a)$ grounds $G(a)$, then $G(a)$ obtains because $F(a)$ does. Also, when $F(a)$ grounds $G(a)$ and (by asymmetry)
Indeed, for any truth make it the case that truth self-unplainly true, as does any other principle. Atomic, unplain truths specifically, the class of propositions we consider a kind of grounding relation. The seeming tension is this: we have taken the idea that the grounding of reflexivity of grounding relations to be apparent. The reflexitivity of apparent. The reflexitivity of every property manifests itself, because for any property it is a priori that the property plays the truth role for the domain to which it belongs. We conclude from the above considerations that lower-level truth grounds higher-level truth on the alethic disjunctivist and second-order functionalist views. Whenever a proposition has the disjunctive truth property, it is because it has the disjunct truth property of the domain to which it belongs, and not vice versa. Similarly for the second-order functionalist truth property and realizer properties.

We now turn to Lynch’s manifestation functionalism. We have saved it until last because there may seem to be a tension between the way in which we have talked about grounding and the way in which Lynch talks about manifestation—which, as indicated, he considers a kind of grounding relation. The seeming tension is this: we have taken grounding relations to be irreflexive, while Lynch explicitly says that manifestation is reflexive. Every property manifests itself, because for any property it is a priori that the set of its essential features is a subset of the set of its essential features.

We will now suggest that for a certain class of propositions the tension is only apparent. The reflexivity of manifestation (as applied to properties) is compatible with the idea that the grounding of truth (as applied to propositions) is irreflexive. More specifically, the class of propositions we have in mind is the class of atomic, unplain truths. Atomic, unplain truths are (immanence) true, T_i, and also have a further distinct truth-manifesting property M_i. Now, truth manifests itself for propositions that are unplainly true, as does any other property possessed by these propositions. But the fact that truth self-manifests for any proposition p that is atomic and unplainly true does not make it the case that T_i(p) grounds T_i(p). Rather, we must look to the further, distinct truth-manifesting property M_i for grounding:

\[(i) \quad M_i(p) \text{ grounds } T_i(p)\]

Indeed, for any atomic, unplain truth p, the manifestation functionalist will say the following:
(ii) If \( M_i(p) \) grounds \( T_i(p) \), then it is not the case that \( T_i(p) \) grounds \( M_i(p) \).

(iii) It is not the case that \( M_i(p) \) grounds \( M_i(p) \).

(iii') It is not the case that \( T_i(p) \) grounds \( T_i(p) \).

In other words, the grounding of atomic, unplain truth for propositions is asymmetric and irreflexive on the manifestation functionalist picture. But this should be distinguished from—and is compatible with—the manifestation relation being reflexive on properties.

What has just been said leaves the question what to say about the grounding of the truth of compounds and atomic, plain truths according to the manifestation functionalist. As seen, all compounds are plainly true, so we can focus our discussion by considering plain truth. Things get a little tricky here. Where \( q \) is a plain truth—whether atomic or compound—Lynch explicitly denies that \( q \) has some truth-manifesting property \( M_i \), distinct from truth, \( T_i \). He takes \( q \) to be just \( T_i \), i.e. immanence true. This might be taken to suggest that

(iv') \( T_i(q) \) grounds \( T_i(q) \),

i.e. that \( q \)’s truth grounds itself. But it is not clear that the manifestation functionalist would want to commit to (iv') if “grounds” is to be read as involving a commitment to a self-sufficiency claim—that \( q \)’s being true is what makes \( q \) true, or that \( q \) depends only on itself for its truth.

One way of avoiding a self-sufficiency claim would be to take plain truth to be dependent on unplain truth, in the sense of letting the latter serve as a supervenience base of the former:

(PT') Plain truth supervenes on unplain truth: a plain truth cannot change its truth-value without there being a change in the truth-value of some true, atomic proposition whose truth is strongly grounded (i.e. due to the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from truth).

If (PT') holds good on the manifestation functionalist picture, plain truth can be regarded as being weakly grounded on unplain truth. Plain truths are not directly grounded in the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from truth, and yet they depend—in the sense of supervening—on truths that are thus grounded.21 In particular, one can say that the plain truth of the truth-attribution “It is true that grass is green” supervenes on the unplain truth of “Grass is green” (as does Lynch). Similarly, one can say that the truth of “Earth is spherical and 2 + 2 = 4” supervenes on the unplain truth of respectively “Earth is spherical” and “2 + 2 = 4”.

Now, Lynch does seem to think that some propositions are plainly true and do not depend for their truth on any unplain truth. Consider “There is milk in the fridge”. Suppose that it is true. If so, we are dealing with an atomic truth. It is also a contingent, unplain truth. Things could have been otherwise, and the truth of the proposition is grounded in its correspondence with reality, i.e. in the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from truth. Now consider “If there is milk in Bob’s fridge, there is milk in Bob’s fridge”. This is a compound truth. As such it is plainly true, following Lynch. But it does not seem to depend for its truth on any unplain truth. Whatever \( p \) might be, any compound of the form “If \( p \), then \( p \)” is true, and necessarily so

21 Lynch (2009, p. 90) endorses the following supervenience thesis for compound truth: “There can be no change in the truth-value of a compound proposition without change in the truth-value of some true propositions.” He labels this the “weak grounding principle”. Our use of “weak grounding” is consonant with Lynch’s usage. However, the supervenience relata differ as we have formulated (PT') in terms of plain and unplain truths rather than compound and atomic truths.
(Lynch’s example, this volume). It is true purely as a matter of logical form, irrespective of how the world is vis-a-vis \( p \). The same applies to other logical truths.\(^{22}\)

It seems pretty clear that Lynch takes logically necessary truths, a certain type of plain truths, not to be dependent on any unplain truth. However, in saying this we take it that Lynch must have in mind something other than dependence-as-supervenience, and that he would not take logically necessary truths to undermine the supervenience thesis (PT\(^{+}\)). The reason for this is simple: necessary truths supervene on everything, because they hold true regardless of what the world is like. Thus, trivially, logical truth—classified as plain truth—supervenes on unplain truth. Many other plain truths, of course, supervene non-trivially on unplain truth. E.g., the plain truth of “Liverpool’s home colours are red, and the speeding limit in cities in Denmark is 50 km/hr” supervenes on the unplain truth of the two ingredient conjuncts. The supervenience is non-trivial, because the conjunction is not true regardless of how the world is.

In sum, we take it that Lynch can maintain that plain truth supervenes on unplain truth, i.e. that he can endorse (PT\(^{+}\)). Now, supervenience captures a kind of metaphysical dependence. At the same time, we submit that this kind of dependence can seem a bit hazy compared to direct or strong grounding. The idea that plain truth supervenes on unplain truth gives us at most that plain truth somehow depends on unplain truth.

Overall, on the manifestation functionalist picture, we can thus say that all truth is ultimately grounded in—or ultimately depends on—the lower-level, truth-manifesting properties distinct from (immanence) truth. As we have seen, the truth of any unplain truth \( p \) is directly, or strongly, grounded in its possession of a truth-manifesting property distinct from truth itself. As also seen, the truth of any plain truth is ultimately, or somehow, grounded in truth-manifesting properties distinct from truth itself, by the supervenience theses endorsed by the manifestation functionalist.\(^{23}\)

5. The priority of pluralism: the Many grounding the One

Above we have seen that three out of four pluralist views are of a mixed character. They incorporate both moderate pluralism and moderate monism. This raises an interesting question: are these views more pluralist than monist, or the other way around? Or maybe they are equally pluralist and monist? Below we argue that mixed pluralist views (of the kind considered) are distinctively more pluralist than monist. The previous section has provided a sound basis for thinking so.\(^{24}\) We first turn to alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism, then to manifestation functionalism.

Recall that alethic disjunctivism is moderately monist due to its incorporation of the thesis that there is a generic, disjunctive truth property \( (T_c) \) that applies to all true propositions. Recall also that the view is moderately pluralist due to its commitment to the existence of a plurality of truth properties \( T_1 \ldots T_n \).

As seen in the preceding section, for any proposition \( p \), \( T_c(p) \) is always strongly grounded in \( T_i(p) \) for some \( T_i \) (\( 1 \leq i \leq n \)). That is, generic truth is always strongly grounded in domain-specific truth. A proposition is generically true, because it has the

---

\(^{22}\) This last statement should be qualified. If logical pluralism can be regarded as a natural companion of alethic pluralism (Lynch 2009, Chap. 5; Pedersen (forthcoming)), whether a compound \( \Phi \) qualifies as a logical truth might not merely be a function of its logical form, but also of the subject-matter to which its constituents pertain. E.g., in general, anything of the form “\( p \lor \neg p \)” will qualify as a logical truth provided that \( p \) belongs to a domain that conforms to classical logic, while this is not so for domains over which intuitionistic logic holds sway (and that include propositions that are not effectively decidable).

\(^{23}\) Another very interesting proposal concerning alethic pluralism and grounding is due to Edwards. See his contribution to this volume for details, and Wright’s contribution for further discussion of Edwards’ proposal.

\(^{24}\) The focus is specifically on alethic disjunctivism rather than mixed pluralist views more generally.
truth property of the domain to which it belongs. These relations are not reversible. It is not the case that \( T_i(p) \) is grounded in \( T_G(p) \), and it is not the case that \( T(p) \) obtains because \( T_G(p) \). So, although \( T_G(p) \) and \( T(p) \) are bi-conditionally related, there is an asymmetry: \( T(p) \) is metaphysically prior to \( T_G(p) \). In other words, the lower-level properties are more fundamental than the higher-level property. In light of this we conclude that alethic disjunctivism is distinctively more pluralist than monist.

What we have said just about alethic disjunctivism applies to second-order functionalism, too. The reasoning is similar, with the possession of the realizer property of the relevant domain serving to ground strongly the possession of the second-order functional truth property. As before, the lower-level properties are thus metaphysically more fundamental than the higher-level property. Hence, second-order functionalism is distinctively more pluralist than monist.

How about manifestation functionalism, the third mixed view? This view, too, is more pluralist than monist from a metaphysical point of view. However, the possession of the higher-level truth property is not generally as strongly grounded in lower-level truth properties as on the two other mixed views. Recall that the only truth property plain truths have is the immanent truth property, \( T_i \). However, as also seen, plain truth supervenes on unplain truth—on some truth that is directly grounded in the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from (immanent) truth. In this sense unplain truth—and so, the lower-level truth-manifesting properties—are more metaphysically fundamental than the higher-level truth property.

For all three mixed views we have thus seen that the Many ground the One, i.e. that the pluralist component of these views is more fundamental than its monist counterpart.

6. Why alethic disjunctivism is relatively compelling

In this section, we wish to support the claim made at the outset of the paper—namely, that alethic disjunctivism is relatively compelling. By this we mean that the strong pluralist, the second-order functionalist and manifestation functionalist should all find it hard to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism.

6.1 Alethic disjunctivism and SAP

The strong alethic pluralist is committed to alethic disjunctivism. To argue this point let us start by recalling that the strong pluralist grants that the existence of the domain-specific truth properties \( T_1 \ldots T_n \). We now claim that, given the existence of truth properties \( T_1 \ldots T_n \), the strong alethic pluralist is also committed to the existence of the generic, disjunctive truth property \( T_G \). To reach a verdict on this matter, it is relevant to consider different stances on property ontology. Here we can contrast liberal and conservative approaches. The so-called abundant conception is an example of the former kind of approach: for any set of things, there is a property possessed by exactly the members of that set. In particular:

\[
\text{(Abun,)} \quad \text{If there is a range of } m\text{-place properties } F_1 \ldots F_n \text{ of the same order, then there is an } m\text{-place property } F, \text{ such that } F(a_1 \ldots a_m) \text{ if and only if } F_1(a_1 \ldots a_m) \text{ or } \ldots \text{ or } F_n(a_1 \ldots a_m). 
\]

Instantiating (Abun,.) with \( T_1 \ldots T_n \) immediately delivers \( T_G \). So, if the objective is to resist alethic disjunctivism in a principled manner, the strong pluralist should not be liberal with respect to property ontology.
Might the sparse conception of properties—an exemplification of a conservative stance—be of help to the strong pluralist? According to this conception, objects need to be qualitatively similar in order to share a property. In particular, the propositions that are supposed to possess the disjunctive truth property must be unified by a qualitative similarity. The sparse conception is thus much more restrictive than the abundant conception. It imposes a substantive constraint on the existence of $T_G$, while the abundant conception imposes no such constraint. However, the increased degree of conservativeness that goes with the sparse conception is of no help to the strong pluralist in our present context. For recall that the strong pluralist has granted that the domain-specific truth properties $T_1 \ldots T_n$ qualify as truth properties in virtue of satisfying a set of truisms or platitudes that jointly delineate the truth concept. As such, the propositions that have one of $T_1 \ldots T_n$ are qualitatively similar. They all have a property that satisfy the truisms or platitudes. This, we submit, shows that the disjunctive truth property should be included in the strong pluralist’s property ontology, even if she endorses the sparse conception of properties.25 If the strong pluralist has no means of resisting commitment to $T_G$, her view collapses into alethic disjunctivism. Since strong pluralism is the only pure kind of pluralism, a further conclusion suggests itself: pure pluralist positions cannot be upheld. In turn, this means that the only tenable positions in the pluralist landscape are of a mixed character. That is, they incorporate both moderate pluralism and moderate monism—the former because of the domain-specific truth properties $T_1 \ldots T_n$, the latter because of the generic disjunctive property $T_G$. This is a significant conclusion, as it decreases the territory that can be tenably held by the pluralist.

Let us briefly consider one other response to the argument just offered. We have proceeded on the assumption that the strong pluralist grants that the domain-specific truth properties $T_1 \ldots T_n$ are unified by their respective satisfaction of the truisms or platitudes. This is what delivers the qualitative similarity that underwrites the existence of the disjunctive truth property $T_G$. However, might one endorse the thesis that there is a plurality of truth properties $T_1 \ldots T_n$ (that does not include a truth property had by all true propositions) and drop the story about the truisms or platitudes? This strikes us as a bad idea. It would leave one with the task of saying what makes $T_1 \ldots T_n$ truth properties. This task would be quite a difficult one if no appeal can be made to truisms, platitudes, or something else that can serve as a characterization of truth (and which would, arguably, provide a basis for qualitative similarity).

6.2 Alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism

It is difficult for the second-order functionalist to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism. The second-order functional truth property, $T_{2OF}$, and the disjunctive truth property, $T_G$, are sufficiently similar that it would be quite odd for the second-order functionalist to endorse the existence of the former, while rejecting the existence of the latter. They are sufficiently similar in the sense of being necessarily co-extensional.

Let us first consider the claim that $T_{2OF}$ and $T_G$ are co-extensional, leaving the modal aspect for later. We can support this claim as follows: let $R_1 \ldots R_n$ be the properties that the second-order functionalist takes to play the truth-role for domain$_1 \ldots$ domain$_n$. These properties are the domain-specific truth properties endorsed by the

25 The line of argument just presented goes against Pedersen (2006) which tries to resist alethic disjunctivism by suggesting that the generic disjunctive truth property can be rejected by appealing to the sparse conception of properties. However, conversations with Lynch have convinced Pedersen that the disjunctive truth property cannot be ruled out by appealing to the sparse conception, for the reason just given. Pedersen (2010), on the other hand, sympathetically explores alethic disjunctivism. Edwards (ms) offers an interesting discussion of sparseness in relation to alethic disjunctivism.
alethic disjunctivist. Consider now the properties $T_{2OF}$ and $T_G$, respectively the property of having a property that plays the truth-role (for the relevant domain) and the property of being either $R_1$ (and belonging to domain$_1$) or ... or $R_n$ (and belonging to domain$_n$).

These properties are co-extensional:

Claim: for all $p$, $p \in \text{ext}(T_G)$ if and only if $p \in \text{ext}(T_{2OF})$.

\[ \Rightarrow \] Suppose that $p \in \text{ext}(T_G)$. Then $R_i(p)$ and domain$_i(p)$ for some $R_i$ among $R_1$ ... $R_n$. But $R_i$ plays the truth-role for domain$_i$, to which $p$ belongs. So, $p \in \text{ext}(T_{2OF})$.

\[ \Leftarrow \] Suppose that $p \in \text{ext}(T_{2OF})$. Then $p$ has the property $R_i$ that plays the truth-role for domain$_i$, to which $p$ belongs. But $R_i$ is the property in virtue of which $p$—and other propositions from domain$_i$—can be made true. So, $p \in \text{ext}(T_G)$.

We can strengthen the conclusion that $T_{2OF}$ and $T_G$ are co-extensional to the conclusion that they are so necessarily. We are in a position to do so, because the above argument relies only on the characterizations of the two truth properties in question.

If $T_{2OF}$ and $T_G$ were the same property, it would obviously be incoherent to grant the existence of the former, while denying the existence of the latter. Necessary co-extension—what has just been established for $T_{2OF}$ and $T_G$—is required for identity between properties, but presumably it falls short of being sufficient. Yet, it does make them sufficiently similar to suggest that it is odd to think that only $T_{2OF}$ exists. Necessary co-extension—what has just been established for $T_{2OF}$ and $T_G$—is required for identity between properties, but presumably it falls short of being sufficient. Yet, it does make them sufficiently similar to suggest that it is odd to think that only $T_{2OF}$ exists. We think that an independent reason that supports the opposite conclusion is available. Both $T_{2OF}$ and $T_G$ apply to propositions that have a property that satisfies the principles that serve to delineate the truth concept—the truisms or platitudes, as it were. As such, $T_{2OF}$ and $T_G$ apply to things that are qualitatively similar. This, in turn, makes it difficult to see why they should not be admitted into the ontology, even from the point of view of someone who occupies a conservative stance with respect to property ontology. But notice that the two properties are on a par in this regard, and so, that it would be quite odd to suppose that only one of them exists.

6.3 Alethic disjunctivism and manifestation functionalism

We will now argue that, by the lights of the manifestation functionalist, it is difficult to deny that the generic disjunctive property is a suitable truth property.

According to the manifestation functionalist, truth is the property that has the truish features as a matter of necessity—that is, “the property that is, necessarily, had by believed contents just when things are as they are believed to be; had by propositions believed at the end of inquiry and which makes propositions correct to believe.” (Lynch this volume, p. 13 in ms.) As seen earlier, according to Lynch, a property must have the truish features in order to qualify as a truth property. We will now argue that the disjunctive truth property, $T_G$, has the truish features as a matter of necessity—and so, in this crucial respect is just like the truth property envisioned by the manifestation functionalist.

---

26 Think of the property of being an odd number divisible by 2 with 0 remainder and the property of being an integer solution to the equation $x = \sqrt{2}$. In all possible worlds these two properties have nothing in their extension, and so, they are necessarily co-extensional. Yet, they are not identical.
The task that must be executed is the following: show that $T_G$ necessarily has the following features:

**Objectivity:** For all $p$, $p$ is $T_G$ if and only if (if $p$ is believed, things are believed to be as they are).

**Norm of Belief:** For all $p$, $p$ is $T_G$ if and only if it is correct to believe $p$.

**End of Inquiry:** For all $p$, if $p$ is $T_{G'}$, then believing $p$ is a worthy goal of inquiry.

Here we also recall that $T_G$ is characterized as follows:

$$(TG) \quad (\forall p)(T_G(p) \leftrightarrow T_1(p) \lor \ldots \lor T_n(p))$$

The last thing we need to recall before executing the task we have set ourselves is to note the following:

$$(SAT) \quad \text{The domain-specific truth properties } T_1 \ldots T_n \text{ satisfy the truisms.}$$

Let us now turn to Objectivity. We break our argument into two parts, one for each direction of the bi-conditional:

$$\Rightarrow$$

(1) $T_G(p)$ \hspace{1cm} Assumption
(2) If $T_G(p)$, then $T(p)$ \hspace{1cm} (for some $T$) \hspace{1cm} (TG)
(3) $T(p)$ \hspace{1cm} (1), (2)
(4) $T(p)$ if and only if (if $p$ is believed, things are believed to be as they are). \hspace{1cm} (SAT)
(5) If $p$ is believed, things are believed to be as they are. \hspace{1cm} (3), (4)
(6) If $T_G(p)$, then (if $p$ is believed, things are believed to be as they are). \hspace{1cm} (1), (5)

$$\Leftarrow$$

(1) If $p$ is believed, things are believed to be as they are. \hspace{1cm} Assumption
(2) $T(p)$ if and only if, if $p$ is believed, things are believed to be as they are. \hspace{1cm} (SAT)
(3) $T(p)$ \hspace{1cm} (2), (3)
(4) $T_G(p)$ \hspace{1cm} (TG)
(5) If (if $p$ is believed, things are believed to be as they are), then $T_G(p)$. \hspace{1cm} (1), (4)

Now, $p$ was arbitrary. Hence, by combining $\Rightarrow$ and $\Leftarrow$ we get the desired result: for all $p$, $p$ is $T_G$ if and only if (if $p$ is believed, things are believed to be as they are).

The arguments for Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry are similar and included in Appendix A. We get that, necessarily, $T_G$ has the truis features (or satisfies the truisms), because we have relied only on the characterization of $T_G$ and (SAT), a thesis that holds of necessity. In sum, the disjunctive truth property $T_G$ would appear to have the key characteristic that the manifestation functionalist associates with truth.\(^{28}\) Furthermore,

---

\(^{27}\) Strictly speaking, $T_G$ was characterized by $(\forall p)(T_G(p) \leftrightarrow (T_1(p) \land \text{domain}(p)) \lor \ldots \lor (T_n(p) \land \text{domain}(p)))$. However, in line with what we have done thus far, we will leave the domain conjuncts implicit. This does not impact the arguments to be given. They can be modified with the relevant domain conjunct figuring explicitly, the result being that the arguments will be a few lines longer.

\(^{28}\) Two things deserve to be mentioned. First, the conclusion that $T_G$ satisfies the truisms and does so necessarily would appear to put pressure on Lynch’s use of the definite article in the characterization of manifestation functionalist truth. At least it does so, given his rejection of the idea that $T_G$ is the unique property qualifying as truth on the manifestation functionalist view. For more on this point, see Pedersen and Edwards (forthcoming). Second, it seems to us that the argument just given can be modified so it applies in the case of the second-order functional truth property, too. See Appendix B for details. This point is highly relevant to Lynch (2009), because one of Lynch’s main reasons for moving away from second-order
this key characteristic can be used to account for the unity of truth on the alethic disjunctivist view. One might reasonably wonder what unifies the domain-specific—or disjunct—truth properties $T_1 \ldots T_n$.\(^{29}\) E.g., in a fashion analogous to Lynch’s worry about the second-order functionalist property, one might wonder whether $T_G$ really has the truish features. We take ourselves to have shown that $T_G$ does, indeed, have these features. This puts us in a position to answer the question of unity: truths have something substantial in common. They all have a property that, necessarily, has the truish features.

7. Conclusion

We have pursued—and hopefully successfully executed—a number of tasks in this paper. First, we hope to have provided a useful overview of the pluralist landscape. We take it that the distinctions between moderate and strong versions of respectively monism and pluralism exhaust logical space. However, we also take it that the four specific varieties of pluralism discussed here do not exhaust the pluralist part of that space. At the same time, the four varieties surveyed should be of particular interest in that they are prominent in the pluralist literature. Second, we hope to have shed some interesting light on alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism—the three mixed pluralist views—by discussing the idea of metaphysical grounding that is an integral part of each of them. Although they all incorporate a monist thesis, as the discussion made clear, they are distinctively more pluralist than monist from a metaphysical point of view. Again, to use a slogan: the Many ground the One. Third, but not least, we hope to have made a case for thinking that alethic disjunctivism is relatively compelling—that the three other kinds of pluralist will find it hard to reject the view. For the strong pluralist, the generic, disjunctive truth property suggests itself, because it should be admitted into the ontology even by conservative standards with respect to property ontology. It will be difficult for the second-order functionalist to resist alethic disjunctivism, because her favoured truth property and the disjunctive truth property turn out to be quite similar. Lastly, the disjunctive truth property has the truish features as a matter of necessity—which on the manifestation functionalist view is the key characteristic of truth.

Appendix A: $T_G$ satisfies Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry

Norm of Belief:

\[ \Rightarrow \]

1. $T_G(p)$

2. If $T_G(p)$, then $T_i(p)$ (for some $T_i$) \((TG)\)

3. $T_i(p)$ \((1), (2)\)

4. $T_i(p)$ if and only if it is correct to believe that $p$ \((SAT)\)

5. It is correct to believe that $p$ \((3), (4)\)

6. If $T_G(p)$, then it is correct to believe that $p$ \((1), (5)\)

\[ \Leftarrow \]

1. It is correct to believe that $p$ \Assumption

---

\(^{29}\) This issue was pressed by Crispin Wright in discussion.
(2) \( T(p) \) if and only if it is correct to believe that \( p \)  
(3) \( T(p) \)  
(4) \( T_\circ(p) \)  
(5) If it is correct to believe that \( p \), then \( T_\circ(p) \)  

Proposition \( p \) was arbitrary. Thus, putting together \( \Rightarrow \) and \( \Leftarrow \), we get that \( T_G \) satisfies Norm of Belief: for all \( p, p \) is \( T_G \) if and only if it is correct to believe \( p \).

End of Inquiry:

\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad T_\circ(p) \quad \text{Assumption} \\
(2) & \quad \text{If } T_\circ(p), \text{ then } T(p) \quad \text{(for some } T) \quad \text{(TG)} \\
(3) & \quad T(p) \quad (1), (2) \\
(4) & \quad \text{If } T(p), \text{ then believing } p \text{ is a worthy goal of inquiry} \quad \text{(SAT)} \\
(5) & \quad \text{Believing } p \text{ is a worthy goal of inquiry} \quad (3), (4) \\
(6) & \quad \text{If } T_\circ(p), \text{ then believing } p \text{ is a worthy goal of inquiry} \quad (1), (5) \\

\end{align*}

Proposition \( p \) was arbitrary. Therefore, for all \( p, \) if \( T_\circ(p) \), then believing \( p \) is a worthy goal of inquiry.

Appendix B: \( T_{2O} \) satisfies the truisms

The truth property of second-order functionalism, \( T_{2O} \), is characterized as follows:

\[ (T_{2O}) \quad \text{The property of being true (} T_{2O} \text{) is the property of having a property that plays the truth-role (relative to the relevant domain),} \]

Furthermore, it is an integral part of the view that

\[ (\text{SAT}^{2O}) \quad \text{A property plays the truth-role for domain, if it has the truish features for every proposition belonging to that domain.} \]

Given \( (T^{2O}) \) and \( (\text{SAT}^{2O}) \), we can straightforwardly modify the argument provided in the case of \( T_G \) to show that \( T_{2O} \) satisfies Objectivity:

\[ \Rightarrow \]

\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad T_{2O}(p) \quad \text{Assumption} \\
(2) & \quad \text{If } T_{2O}(p), \text{ then } T(p) \quad \text{(for some } T) \quad (T^{2O}) \\
(3) & \quad T(p) \quad (1), (2) \\
(4) & \quad \text{If } T(p), \text{ if and only if (if } p \text{ is believed, things are believed to be as they are).} \quad (\text{SAT}^{2O}) \\
(5) & \quad \text{If } p \text{ is believed, things are believed to be as they are.} \quad (3), (4) \\
(6) & \quad \text{If } T_{2O}(p), \text{ then (if } p \text{ is believed, things are believed to be as they are).} \quad (1), (5) \\

\end{align*}

\[ \Leftarrow \]

\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad \text{If } p \text{ is believed, things are believed to be as they are.} \quad \text{Assumption} \\
(2) & \quad T(p) \quad \text{(2), (3)} \\
(3) & \quad T(p) \quad \text{(SAT}^{2O}) \\
(4) & \quad T_{2O}(p) \quad \text{(TG)} \\
(5) & \quad \text{If (if } p \text{ is believed, things are believed to be as they are), then } T_{2O}(p). \quad (1), (4) \\

\end{align*}

Proposition \( p \) was arbitrary. So, by combining \( \Rightarrow \) and \( \Leftarrow \) we get the desired result: for all \( p, p \) is \( T_{2O} \) if and only if (if \( p \) is believed, things are believed to be as they are). The
arguments for Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry can likewise be obtained by straightforwardly modifying the arguments provided for $T_G$.

One of Lynch’s main reasons for moving away from second-order functionalism and adopt manifestation functionalism instead is that he takes $T_{20}$ not to have the truish features (2009, pp. 64-66). As such, in his view, it fails to be a truth property properly so-called. The argument we have just provided suggests that Lynch has concluded too swiftly that the truth property of second-order functionalism fails in this respect.

References

—. (Forthcoming). Pluralism & Paradox. This volume.

David, M. (Forthcoming). Lynch’s Functionalist Theory of Truth. This volume.

Dodd, J. (Forthcoming). Deflationism Trumps Pluralism! This volume.

—. (Forthcoming). Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism. This volume.
—. (Ms). On alethic disjunctivism. Manuscript.


—. (Forthcoming). Should We Be Pluralists about Truth? This volume.

—. (Forthcoming). Three questions about truth pluralism. This volume.


——. (Forthcoming). A Plurality of Pluralisms? This volume.