

Pluralism about truth as alethic disjunctivism*

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Abstract

The past decade has marked a period of significant development for pluralist theories of truth. This paper utilizes several distinctions to categorize the current theoretical landscape, and then compares the theoretical structure of four pluralist theories—namely, strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism. We conclude by arguing that it is difficult for adherents of the three other pluralist views to reject the viability of some form of alethic disjunctivism. By this we mean that, by the lights of each of these other views, there is a disjunctive truth property that ought to qualify as a legitimate truth property.

Keywords: alethic pluralism, alethic monism, alethic functionalism, alethic disjunctivism, grounding, Crispin Wright, Michael Lynch.

1. Monism *vs.* pluralism

Traditional views on truth have often combined two theses, *monism about truth* and *substantivism about truth*. According to monism, there is exactly one way of being true. According to substantivism, truth is a property with a substantial nature or underlying essence. In combining them, traditionalists have supposed that the property of being true is reducible to some other alethic property, such as identity or correspondence; and it is in terms of this property that truth is to be accounted for across all truth-apt discourse.¹ Hence, early correspondence theories had it that truth always consists in correspondence to fact, whether in mathematical discourse (e.g., $2^3 + 5^2 = 33$), physical discourse (e.g., *electrons have negative charge*), or moral discourse (e.g., *burning heretics at the stake is wrong*).

Other traditional theories exhibit roughly the same structure, merely exchanging

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¹ Note that monism does not entail that all discourse is truth-apt, but rather, that any and all discourse, when truth-apt, must be so in the same way. Thus, monists aren't committed, by their theory of truth, to the truth-aptness of any or all particular kinds of discourse—they can happily grant the denial of truth-aptness to propositions in normative ethics and moral theory, for example.

the analysans for something deemed more plausible—coherence, superassertability, agreement at the end of inquiry, concordance, and so forth.²

Traditionalists meet opposition from two camps: deflationists and pluralists. Both camps construe the combination of monism and substantivism as being fundamentally misguided, but differ as to which of these two theses instigates the problem.³ According to deflationists, truth does not have a deep underlying essence or substantive nature that can be subjected to rigorous analysis and which could go beyond our concept of it. Rather, all there is to say about truth is captured by the disquotational schema (DS), equivalence schema (ES), or operator schema (OS):

(DS) *'p'* is true if, and only if, *p*.

(ES) $\langle p \rangle$ is true if, and only if, *p*.

(OS) it is true that *p* if, and only if, *p*.

Based on these or related schemas, deflationary analyses of predicative and attributive uses of 'true' suggest that truth is a merely expressive or logical device—one that is unlikely to participate in the explanation of other phenomena such as rationality, intentionality, meaning, or cognition. According to pluralists, however, the traditionalist's mistake is not that she takes correspondence, coherence, agreement at the end of inquiry, etc. to be legitimate objects of study in reductively analyzing the nature of truth. Rather, the mistake lies in assuming that studying one of these properties will exhaust what there is to say about

² C. J. G. Wright posited superassertability as an epistemically-constrained property of truth, thereby improving upon similar posits advocated by Putnam and Peirce: 'a [proposition] is superassertable if, and only if, it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information (Wright 1992, p. 48). Lynch presents concordance as a candidate for truth in the moral domain: '*p* is concordant if, and only if, *p* supercoheres with a moral framework and that framework's morally-relevant non-moral judgments are true' (2009: 175 ff).

³ See Beall (forthcoming) for an example of a deflationary pluralist, however; see also Lynch (2009: 65), who argues that C. J. G. Wright's version of discourse pluralism is, contrary to appearances, quite deflationary.

truth. While specific properties may be plausible truth candidates in certain domains, each of them falters in others, and so no single property can cover all there is to say about truth-apt discourse. For example, truths about concrete objects can plausibly be accounted for in terms of correspondence to fact, although correspondence appears much less plausible when it comes to accounting for truths in topology or business advertising. Thus, the explanatory scope of correspondence theories is not wide enough; and *mutatis mutandis* for other traditional views.⁴

Viewed at this simplistic level of description, the relationship between these three camps can thus be understood as an inconsistent triad (see fig. 1). The traditionalist's conjunction of monism and substantivism is inconsistent with both the deflationism's rejection of substantivism and the pluralist's rejection of monism; the deflationist's conjunction of monism and insubstantivism is inconsistent with both the traditionalist's acceptance of substantivism and the pluralist's rejection of monism; and the pluralists's conjunction of substantivism and the rejection of monism is inconsistent with both the deflationism's acceptance of insubstantivism and the traditionalist's acceptance of monism.




Figure 1. Pluralism, deflationism, and traditionalism

⁴ This consideration against traditional monistic theories was expressed by O'Connor (1975: 13), among others, and has been called the oscillation of 'modesty and presumptuousness' (Wright 1992, pp. 1–2), the 'problem of the common denominator' (Sher, 1998, pp. 133–4; Wright 2005, pp. 1–4), and the 'scope problem' (Lynch 2004, p. 385; 2009, pp. 49–52). For an argument that the significance attributed to this consideration is overblown, and so fails to give pluralism any leverage over deflationism, see Dodd (forthcoming).

Although both monists and pluralists are united in taking inflationism to be the appropriate approach to truth, the relationship between their respective theories is more nuanced.⁵ Turning first to monism, let us distinguish between weaker and stronger versions:

(SM) There is exactly one truth property, which is possessed by all true propositions. (*strong monism*)

(MM) There is a truth property, which is possessed by all true propositions. (*moderate monism*)

In parallel, we can distinguish between two versions of pluralism:

(SP) There is more than one truth property, and no truth property is possessed by all true propositions. (*strong pluralism*)

(MP) There is more than one truth property. (*moderate pluralism*)

Strong monism entails a commitment to its moderate counterpart, but not vice versa. It is also incompatible with both versions of pluralism: if there is exactly one truth property, then obviously there cannot be more than one, as both strong and moderate pluralists contend. Likewise, strong pluralism entails a commitment to its moderate counterpart, but not vice versa.⁶ And it too is

⁵ See, e.g., Lynch (2000, 2001), Sher (2004), Wright (2005), Pedersen (2006, 2010), Edwards (2008), and Wright & Pedersen (2010) for alternative construals of the strong / weak distinction.

⁶ What has been labeled 'strong alethic pluralism' here shouldn't be conflated with what Lynch refers to as 'simple alethic pluralism' (2006, §2; 2009, pp. 54–5). According to Lynch, simple alethic pluralism is the view that there are a plurality of concepts of truth (as opposed to properties).

incompatible with both versions of monism: if there is no truth property shared by all true propositions—a generic truth property—then there can be no truth property that all true propositions possess, as both strong and moderate monists contend. Strong alethic pluralism is thus noteworthy for being what we will call a ‘pure’ pluralist view. It rejects the thesis that there is any truth property shared by every proposition that has one of the domain-specific truth properties. What specific truth property a proposition has, if true, depends on what domain of discourse it belongs to.⁷

Matters are different when we turn to the moderate versions of the two views. While moderate monism is incompatible with strong pluralism and moderate pluralism with strong monism, the two moderate theses are themselves compatible. The explanation is that the generic truth property to which the moderate monist is committed could be one among the several truth properties to which the moderate pluralist is committed.

2. Three kinds of moderate pluralism

In this section we present alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism—three ‘mixed’ or impure pluralist views that exemplify the compatibility of moderate pluralism and moderate monism about

Theorists attracted to pluralism about truth concepts include, among others, Max Kölbel (cf. 2008, forthcoming) and C. D. Wright (2010, forthcoming). Some critics of C. J. G. Wright also seemed to read him in this way (see, e.g., Pettit 1996; Sainsbury 1996). However, we agree with Lynch’s interpretation that Wright, who explicitly says as much (1996, p. 924), is not a simple alethic pluralist so defined. Rather, he is pretty clearly a moderate pluralist in the sense of (MP), although some have interpreted him as a strong pluralist, too (see Wright 1992, pp. 141–3; 2001, pp. 752–3). However, (SP) can be attributed to Wright only if he rejects the existence of a generic truth property. While Lynch (2006, §3; 2009, pp. 59–62) attributes such a rejection to him on the basis of his earlier work, it is unclear—in our view—whether this work includes enough detail to render such a verdict one way or the other. See Wright (forthcoming) for his most recent take on pluralism.

⁷ As C. J. G. Wright observed, it might not be transparent what truth consists in for certain domains. Figuring out could be a matter of further conceptual reflection, argumentation, or testing (2001, p. 753).

truth. We start by reviewing an approach to conceptual analysis that serves as common ground between many pluralists.

2.1 *Concept delineation via core principles*

The predominant approach to the conceptual analysis of truth has utilized collections of principles—or ‘platitudes’ or ‘truisms’, as they are sometimes called (Wright, 1992; Lynch, 2005c, 2009).⁸ We use the label ‘core principles’. Our reason for doing so is that this label suggests that the principles are important as far as characterizing truth goes, but, unlike ‘platitudes’ and ‘truisms’, it does not suggest that the principles are immediate or obvious in any way, or even certain or infallible.

Pluralists take the core principles jointly to characterize the truth concept by connecting it to other concepts. For example, Lynch’s three favored core principles are:

- (O) For every proposition p , p is true if, and only if, were p to be believed, things would be believed to be as they are. (*objectivity*)
- (NB) For every proposition p , it is prima facie correct to believe p if, and only if, p is true. (*norm of belief*)
- (EI) For every proposition p , other things being equal, believing p is a worthy goal of inquiry if p is true. (*end of inquiry*)⁹

⁸ Unfortunately, no philosopher has yet developed a sufficiently rich account of what it means to say that some p is a truism or a platitude. For criticism of the appeal to platitudes and truisms, see Sher (1998, 2004, 2005) and Wright (2005, 2010).

⁹ See Lynch (2009: 8, 10, 12). It should be noted that Lynch states (O) and (EI) in terms of beliefs, while (NB) is put in terms of propositions (which he takes to be the proper and primary truth-bearer (2009, pp. 129–32)). Also noteworthy is that, as stated by Lynch, (O) and (NB) are schemas, while (EI) has the form of a universal generalization. Here, we adopt the regimented formulation provided by David (forthcoming).

According to Lynch, objectivity, norm of belief, and end of inquiry are non-negotiable in the sense that if anything is to be a theory of truth—as opposed to a theory of something else—then it must include these three principles (2009, p. 17).

Many pluralists seem to be in broad agreement about at least some of the core principles. For example, two of Lynch's truisms share some similarity with two of the three principles that jointly comprise Sher's so-called *immanence thesis* (2004).¹⁰ And some of their three principles share some similarity with one of Wright's two 'parent platitudes' (1992). However, there is no agreement among pluralists as to what the full list of core principles should look like. Furthermore, some pluralists (like Lynch 2001) allow for changes over time, meaning that principles may be dropped from the list or that new ones may be included. These observations point to the need for proper criteria for inclusion in and exclusion from the list of core principles. Wright (2005, 2010) has argued that this methodological approach gives rise to a criteria problem: differences between concepts of truth are determined by the identity and individuation conditions of the conjunctions (lists, etc.) of core principles, and as the conjuncts (items, etc.) change so too do the concepts.

In the absence of criteria for respectively inclusion in and exclusion from the list of core principles, it is thus questionable whether pluralists are entitled to monism about the concept of truth.¹¹ In this paper we set aside the criteria

¹⁰ For further explication, see Sher & Wright's (2007) reconstruction of the immanence thesis using lessons from Kant and Frege, as well as Rattan's (2010) analysis of the concept of truth in terms of its cognitive value for critical reflective thinking.

¹¹ Lynch (2005a) and Wright (2005) agree that such changes need not amount to a conceptual sea-change. But they do lead to polysemy in the semantic structure of truth predication, and the degree to which polysemy gains a foothold is the degree to which the monist thesis about the concept of truth is impercipient. With respect to Lynch's (2009) three core principles in particular, it is possible to endorse them as being necessary for fixing upon the concept of truth. Yet, since they are not jointly sufficient, we are not entitled to the claim that they determinately characterize the concept of truth itself. Again, this makes monism about the concept of truth just another open question—one that is not settled by merely adding ellipses to the list of core principles.

problem, however, and discuss a number of other issues pertaining to pluralism in §§3-5.

2.2 Alethic disjunctivism

We now turn to alethic disjunctivism, the first moderate pluralist view that combines moderate pluralism and moderate monism about truth.¹² Qua pluralism, alethic disjunctivism postulates several domain-specific truth properties T_1, \dots, T_n ; yet, with monism, the view also postulates a generic truth property T_G , characterized as follows:

$$(T_G) \quad (\forall p)[T_G(p) \leftrightarrow ((T_1(p) \wedge \text{domain}_1(p)), \vee \dots, \vee (T_n(p) \wedge \text{domain}_n(p)))]$$

According to (T_G) , a proposition p is generically true just in case either it possesses the truth property of domain_1 and belongs to domain_1 , or possesses the truth property of domain_2 and belongs to domain_2 , ..., or it possesses the truth property of domain_n and belongs to domain_n .

A few further remarks are in place. First, if we utilize the aforementioned methodological approach to conceptual analysis, then what makes the domain-specific properties T_1, \dots, T_n truth properties is their satisfaction of some set of core principles relative to their respective domains in tandem with some further set of principles connecting properties and concepts. Second, mentioning ‘domains’ in the right-hand side of the biconditional is essential to capturing one of the core thoughts behind pluralism, viz., that truth properties are truth properties relative to a domain (the generic, disjunctive property being the only exception—it applies across the board). Thus, it is not enough for the truth of a

¹² For more on alethic disjunctivism, see Pedersen (2006, 2010, forthcoming-a). For other sympathizers, see Cotnoir (2009, p. 478) and Edwards (forthcoming-b).

given proposition (whether generic or domain-specific) that it have a property that is the truth property of some domain. Rather, it needs to be the truth property of the particular domain to which the proposition belongs. To illustrate, suppose that corresponding with reality is the truth property for domain₁, and that superassertibility is so for domain₂. Consider now a proposition p that belongs to domain₁ and is superassertible, but does not correspond. Is p true? No. It does not have the truth property of domain₁, i.e. correspondence, and so it is neither domain-specifically true nor generically true.¹³

Alethic disjunctivism faces competition from other kinds of views that incorporate moderate monism, and so are likewise mixed or impure; these include second-order functionalism (e.g., Lynch 2000, 2001, 2004), manifestation functionalism (e.g., Lynch 2009, forthcoming), and correspondence pluralism (e.g., Sher 2005, forthcoming; Horgan & Potrč 2000; Barnard & Horgan 2006, forthcoming). In §6, we argue that it is difficult for adherents of other moderate pluralist views to reject the viability of some form of alethic disjunctivism. By this we mean that, by the lights of each of these other views, there is a disjunctive truth property T_G that ought to qualify as a legitimate truth property. In this paper, we give special attention to two functionalist views.

2.3 *Second-order functionalism*

According to functionalists, the concept of truth is best characterized by looking at the role that it plays in our cognitive economy. That is, we look for widely—although perhaps tacitly—endorsed principles that connect truth to other concepts (Lynch 2001, 2004, 2009). By reference to these core principles, we can

¹³ Now, precisely because talk of domains is strictly needed, we will often allow ourselves to leave it implicit. For example, we often allow ourselves to talk about a proposition's being generically true in virtue of, e.g., corresponding to fact without tediously adding that correspondence is the truth property for the domain to which the proposition belongs.

specify what it means for a property to play the truth-role relative to a given domain:

- (TR) For any property F , F plays the truth-role relative to domain $_i$ if, and only if, for every proposition p in domain $_i$, F satisfies the salient principles for p .

In turn, (TR) positions one to provide a functionalist characterization of the conditions under which a proposition is true (Lynch 2000, 2004—but with some significant differences; see fns. 14–15):

- (F^{TC}) For every proposition p , p is true if, and only if, p has the property that plays the truth-role for the domain to which p belongs.

According to the second-order functionalist, (F^{TC}) points us directly to what truth—considered as a property—is. It is a certain second-order property, the role-property (Lynch 2001, 2004, 2005a):

- (T²⁰) The property of being true is the property of having the (domain-relevant) property that plays the truth-role.

This characterization of second-order functionalism is schematic in one very crucial respect: it does not include a specification of what the salient principles are. For the sake of illustration (but not endorsement), let us just restrict ourselves to Lynch's three truisms—objectivity, norm of belief, and end of inquiry—as the individually necessary and jointly sufficient principles that

delineate the truth concept exactly. Combined with (TR), this yields the following characterization of a property's playing the truth-role:

- (TR*) For any property F , F plays the truth-role relative to domain _{i} if, and only if, for every proposition p in domain _{i} , (i) p is F if, and only if, were p to be believed, things would be believed to be as they are, (ii) it is prima facie correct to believe p if, and only if, p is F , and (iii) other things being equal, if p is F , then believing p is a worthy goal of inquiry.

Whatever specific set of principles the second-order functionalist endorses, she will say that the properties that play the truth-role are first-order realizer properties—in the jargon familiar from the philosophy of mind—while truth itself is a second-order multiply realizable property. (We will occasionally use ' T^{2OF} '.) T^{2OF} is a second-order property because a proposition's having it is always grounded in the possession of a property in the set of realizer properties—i.e., a property that plays the truth-role for the domain to which the proposition belongs.¹⁴ T^{2OF} is a multiply realizable property because different properties (correspondence, supercoherence, etc.) play the truth-role for different domains, and so truth can be realized in different ways across domains.

Like alethic disjunctivism, second-order alethic functionalism combines moderate pluralism and monism about truth. The view is moderately pluralist in the sense that there are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be

¹⁴ Lynch does not himself relativize the truth-role to domains, as we have done in the presentation of second-order functionalism. Presumably, this needs to be done. The intended realizer properties do not play the truth-role for all propositions; for if they did, it would be difficult to maintain the idea that correspondence and the other realizer properties are alethically potent only *locally*. Indeed, if they did, why shouldn't they be capable of making propositions true, whatever their (truth-apt) domain might be? Here, we draw on David's contribution to this volume (§4), which discusses Lynch's versions of manifestation functionalism. David urges Lynch to relativize the truth-role to domains, but the point also seems apt for any functionalist theory.

true. This is because truth is multiply realizable. Yet, truth's multiple realizability concomitantly underwrites the moderate monism of second-order functionalism: the second-order, multiply realizable property T^{2OF} is had by all true propositions.¹⁵

2.4 *Manifestation functionalism*

We now turn to a different version of functionalism—what we will refer to as ‘manifestation functionalism’. This view substantially overlaps with second-order functionalism. Like the second-order functionalist, the manifestation functionalist seeks to map the nature of truth by looking at the truth-role. She endorses (TR) and (F^{TC}) as specifications of what it is for a property to play the truth-role, and the conditions under which a proposition is true, respectively (Lynch 2009, pp. 70–3). In endorsing manifestation functionalism, Lynch adds detail to (TR) by adopting (TR*): i.e., he adopts objectivity, norm of belief, and end of inquiry as delineating the truth-role. However, when it comes to a characterization of the functionalist truth property, the second-order functionalist's principle (T^{2O}) has been replaced by the following:

- (T^M) The property of being true is the property that has the truish features essentially or which plays the truth-role *as such*. (Lynch 2009, p. 74)

¹⁵ We have attributed second-order functionalism to Lynch (2000, 2001, 2004, 2005a,b,c, 2006). O'Connor (1975: 24) also ‘suggests that [truth] is a second-order relational property’. Note that in these articles, Lynch explicitly formulates the view by relying on Ramsification in order to produce the requisite implicit definition, and does so by appealing to a different list of principles than the one we have just used for illustration. However, the appeal to this technique faces a problem of epistemic circularity (Wright, 2010). As Lynch (forthcoming, fn. 12 in ms) observes, the problem also generalizes to other theories of truth besides second-order functionalism. In part because of such results, we have tried to describe second-order functionalism in abstraction away from both Ramsification and from any particular collection of principles. However, as mentioned earlier, doing so reopens the question of the empirical adequacy of monism about the concept of truth.

—also formulated as follows:

(T^{MN}) The property of being true is the property that is, necessarily, had by believed contents just when things are as they are believed to be; had by propositions believed at the end of inquiry and which makes propositions correct to believe. (Lynch forthcoming, p. 13 in ms.)

(T^M) and (T^{MN}) make no reference to the realizer properties that feature so prominently in the characterization provided by the second-order functionalist. Instead, Lynch characterizes truth as being the property that possesses the truish features essentially. In light of this, one might wonder what relationship the would-be realizer properties, like correspondence or superwarrant, bear to the truth property characterized by (T^M) or (T^{MN})?¹⁶ To shed light on this matter we need to look at what Lynch calls *manifestation* and *immanence*.

Manifestation, like realizability, is a metaphysical grounding relation. If a property *M* manifests a property *I*, something's being *I* is grounded in its being *M*. More precisely, Lynch (2009, pp. 74–5) holds that:

(M) Property *M* manifests property *I* just in case it is a priori that the set of *I*'s conceptually essential features is a subset of *M*'s features.
(*manifestation*)

(I) Property *M* manifests a property *I* just in case *I* is immanent in *M*.
(*immanence*)

¹⁶ At least one of the authors finds the assumption of uniqueness in (T^M) problematic. For now, we will grant the idea that (T^M) characterizes a unique truth property. For further discussion, see §6 and Pedersen (forthcoming-a).

From (M) it follows immediately that the manifestation relation is reflexive, because any set is a subset of itself. Conceptually essential features of a given property F are thought to (i) be part of the nominal essence of F , (ii) hold of F with conceptual necessity, and (iii) serve to distinguish F from other properties. (M) and (I) are presented as capturing a new kind of metaphysical grounding relation—one which is distinct from the determinable/determinate, type/token, and genus/species distinctions, among others.¹⁷ Let us turn to the case where the immanent property is truth. The thought is that alethic properties like correspondence are truth-manifesting properties, i.e., properties that manifest truth or in which truth is immanent. This is the relationship that truth, as characterized by (T^M) and (T^{MN}) , bears to the other properties of interest on the manifestation functionalist view. Following Lynch, one can intuitively think of manifestation and immanence along the following lines: if M manifests I (or I is immanent in M), part of being M is being I (Lynch 2009, p. 75). With this idea in hand, we can think of being true as part of corresponding with reality, and *mutatis mutandis* for other truth-manifesting properties.

Lynch now relativizes manifestation to propositions.¹⁸ What specific property manifests truth for a given proposition depends on its subject matter and its logical structure. Let us turn first to atomic propositions. Consider the following thesis stating a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of atomics where manifestation is understood as above.

¹⁷ See Lynch (2009, pp. 67, 75). For a different conception of immanence, see Sher (2004) and Sher & Wright (2007).

¹⁸ Previously, Lynch (2009, pp. 76–7) relativized manifestation to domains. The switch from relativization to domains to relativization to propositions has been suggested by David (forthcoming), among others.

(T^{CA}) For any atomic proposition p , p is true if, and only if, p has the property M that manifests truth for p and is distinct from truth.

As noted, truth always manifests itself, because manifestation is reflexive. However, (T^{CA}) tells us that what matters for atomic propositions is that there is some further truth-manifesting alethic property that p has. In such cases, we will say that the truth of p is *strongly grounded*. (T^{CA}) tells us that atomic truths are exactly the strongly grounded—or, as Lynch would say, ‘unplain’—truths.

The manifestation functionalist does not hold (T^{CA}) in full generality. Shapiro (forthcoming) argues that there are atomic, plain truths—i.e., truths that are atomic but which are not strongly grounded—and Lynch (forthcoming) agrees. In particular, truth-attributions such as *it is true that grass is green* are atomic and yet plainly true. Hence, they are not true in virtue of possessing some truth-manifesting property other than truth. For this reason there is no exact match between the atomic truths and the unplain truths. Still, Lynch seems sympathetic to the idea that even atomic, plain truths somehow depend on unplain ones. Thus, he takes the truth-value of *it is true that grass is green* to depend on the truth-value of *grass is green*, an atomic unplain truth.

What about compound or complex propositions? According to the manifestation functionalist, these propositions are *plainly true*, where this is to be understood as follows:

(T^P) A proposition p is plainly true just in case it is true and does not have any property distinct from truth that manifests truth for it.
(*plain truth*)

To take an example, consider the conjunctive proposition *Earth is spherical and two plus two equals four*. This proposition is true. Suppose that correspondence is the truth-manifesting property for the first conjunct and coherence for the second one. The truth of both conjuncts is strongly grounded: they each have a property distinct from truth in virtue of which they are true. However, neither correspondence nor coherence manifests truth for the conjunction. Instead the conjunction is plainly true. The conjunction is true, and truth self-manifests, but the conjunction possesses no further truth-manifesting property.

3. Levels and grounding

3.1 Alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism

We will return to plain and unplain truths in §4. Here, notice that strong alethic pluralism is a *one-level view*, in the sense that the extant truth properties posited by the view have no special status with respect to their applicability. They are all alethic properties within which truth consists relative to particular domains. On the other hand, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism can be regarded as *two-level views*. At least one of the properties among the manifold of other ways of being true has an exalted status. For instance, according to alethic disjunctivism, among the disjunct properties there is a unique, generic disjunctive truth property, T_G . For second-order functionalism, among the realizer properties at the lower order, there is the second-order truth property, T_{2OF} . Finally, according to manifestation functionalism, the manifesting properties have a status that is distinct from immanent truth, T_I .

With respect to two-level views, it is an interesting issue how properties that have this special or exalted status relate to those that do not. Lynch (2009) and Pedersen (2010) suggest that the metaphysical link between them is a grounding relation, although they differ over the details. Let us dwell on the idea of metaphysical grounding for a bit.¹⁹ First, we will take grounding to be (strongly) asymmetric, i.e.,

(SA) For all x , if $F(x)$ grounds $G(x)$, then it is not the case that $G(x)$ grounds $F(x)$. (*S-asymmetry*)

Second, we will also take grounding to be irreflexive, i.e.

(IR) For all x , it is not the case that $F(x)$ grounds $F(x)$. (*irreflexivity*)

We take these two features to underwrite certain explanatory claims. If $F(a)$ grounds $G(a)$, then $G(a)$ obtains because $F(a)$ does. Also, when $F(a)$ grounds $G(a)$ and (by asymmetry) we get that $G(a)$ does not ground $F(a)$, and we likewise get the explanatory claim that it is not the case that $F(a)$ obtains because $G(a)$ does.

Now, let us consider grounding in the context of alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism. On the alethic disjunctivist view, a proposition p 's having a disjunct property grounds its having the generic disjunctive truth property, i.e.

(G_v) For all p , $T_i(p)$ grounds $T_G(p)$. (*ground_v*)

¹⁹ Just to be clear on terminology: ' $F(x)$ grounds $G(x)$ ' and ' $G(x)$ in virtue of $F(x)$ ' will be used interchangeably.

(G_v) suggests that $T_G(p)$ obtains because $T_i(p)$ does. And by asymmetry, we also know that it is not the case that $T_G(p)$ grounds $T_i(p)$, in which case $T_i(p)$ does not obtain because of $T_G(p)$. So, when reading the biconditional in (TG)—i.e., $(\forall p)(T_G(p) \leftrightarrow ((T_1(p) \wedge \text{domain}_1(p)) \vee \dots \vee (T_n(p) \wedge \text{domain}_n(p))))$ —one should do so with priority from left to right. For second-order functionalism we get something completely analogous: a proposition p 's having a realizer property grounds its having the second-order functional property, i.e.,

(G_{2OF}) For all p , $T_i(p)$ grounds $T_{2OF}(p)$. (*ground*_{2OF})

(G_{2OF}) suggests that $T_{2OF}(p)$ obtains, because $T_i(p)$ plays the truth-role of domain_i . Again, by asymmetry, we know that it is not the case that $T_{2OF}(p)$ grounds $T_i(p)$ —and that is not the case that $T_i(p)$ obtains, because $T_{2OF}(p)$ does. So, the biconditional in (F^{TC}) should be read with priority from left to right. (Thus, (F^{TC}): for every proposition p , p is true if and only if p has the property that plays the truth-role for the domain to which p belongs.)

We conclude from the above considerations that lower-level truth grounds higher-level truth on the alethic disjunctivist and second-order functionalist views. Whenever a proposition has the disjunctive truth property, it is because it has the disjunct truth property of the domain to which it belongs, and not vice-versa; likewise for the second-order functionalist's role and realizer properties, *mutatis mutandis*. Does the same hold of Lynch's manifestation functionalism? The answer to this question is not straightforward.

3.2 *Manifestation functionalism*

There may seem to be a tension between our presentation of grounding and Lynch's talk of manifestation—which, as indicated, he considers to be a kind of grounding relation. The seeming tension is this: we have taken grounding relations to be irreflexive, while Lynch explicitly says that manifestation is reflexive. Every property manifests itself, because for any property it is a priori that the set of its essential features is a subset of the set of its essential features.

For a certain class of propositions, the tension is only apparent. The reflexivity of manifestation (as applied to properties) is compatible with the grounding of truth (as applied to propositions) being irreflexive. Consider, for example, the class of atomic unplain truths. Atomic, unplain truths are (immanence) true, T_v , and also have a further distinct truth-manifesting property M_i . Now, truth manifests itself for propositions that are unplainly true, as does any other property possessed by these propositions. But the fact that truth self-manifests for any proposition p that is atomic and unplainly true does not make it the case that $T_I(p)$ grounds $T_I(p)$. Rather, we must look to the further, distinct truth-manifesting property M_i for grounding:

- (i) $M_i(p)$ grounds $T_I(p)$

Indeed, for any atomic unplain truth p , the manifestation functionalist will say the following:

- (ii) If $M_i(p)$ grounds $T_I(p)$, then it is not the case that $T_I(p)$ grounds $M_i(p)$.
- (iii ^{M_i}) It is not the case that $M_i(p)$ grounds $M_i(p)$.
- (iii ^{T_I}) It is not the case that $T_I(p)$ grounds $T_I(p)$.

In other words, the grounding of atomic, unplain truth for propositions is asymmetric and irreflexive according to manifestation functionalists. But this should be distinguished from—and is compatible with—the manifestation relation being reflexive on properties.

This leaves open the question of what to say about the grounding of the truth of compounds and atomic, plain truths according to the manifestation functionalist. As seen, all compounds are plainly true, so we can focus our discussion by considering plain truth. Things get a little tricky here—indeed, in our view, they ultimately do so in a way that leads to an unfortunate bifurcation in the metaphysics of manifestation functionalism. Where q is a plain truth—whether atomic or compound—Lynch explicitly denies that q has some truth-manifesting property M_i distinct from truth, T_i . He takes q to be just T_i , i.e., immanence true. This might be taken to suggest that

$$(iv^{T_i}) \quad T_i(q) \text{ grounds } T_i(q),$$

i.e. that q 's truth grounds itself. But it is not clear that the manifestation functionalist would want to commit to (iv^{T_i}) , if 'grounds' is to be read as involving a commitment to a self-sufficiency claim—that q 's being true is what makes q true, or that q depends only on itself for its truth.

One way of avoiding a self-sufficiency claim would be to take plain truth to be asymmetrically dependent or supervenient on unplain truth:

(PT⁵) Plain truth supervenes on unplain truth: a plain truth cannot change its truth-value without there being a change in the truth-value of some true atomic proposition whose truth is strongly

grounded (i.e., due to the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from truth).

If (PT^s) holds good on the manifestation functionalist picture, plain truth can be regarded as being *weakly grounded* on unplain truth. Plain truths are not directly or strongly grounded in the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from truth. Yet they depend or supervene on truths that are grounded.²⁰ In particular, one can say that the plain truth of the truth attribution “*it is true that grass is green*” supervenes on the unplain truth of ‘*grass is green*’ (as does Lynch). Similarly, one can say that the truth of ‘*Earth is spherical and two plus two equals four*’ supervenes on the unplain truth of respectively ‘*Earth is spherical*’ and ‘*two plus two equals four*’.

Now, Lynch does seem to think that some propositions are plainly true and do not depend for their truth on any unplain truth. Suppose, e.g., ‘*There is milk in the fridge*’ is true. Then we are dealing with an atomic truth. It is also a contingent, unplain truth. Things could have been otherwise, and the truth of the proposition is grounded in its correspondence with reality, i.e., in the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from truth. Now consider ‘*If there is milk in Bob’s fridge, then there is milk in Bob’s fridge*’. This is a compound truth. As such it is plainly true, following Lynch. But it does not seem to depend for its truth on any unplain truth. Whatever *p* might be, any compound of the form ‘*If p, then p*’ is true, and necessarily so (see Lynch, forthcoming). It is true purely as a

²⁰ Lynch endorses the following supervenience thesis for compound truth, which he labels the *weak grounding principle*: ‘There can be no change in the truth-value of a compound proposition without change in the truth-value of *some* atomic propositions’ (2009, p. 90). Our use of ‘weak grounding’ is consonant with Lynch’s usage. However, the supervenience relata differ as we have formulated (PT^s) in terms of plain and unplain truths rather than compound and atomic truths.

matter of logical form, irrespective of how the world is vis-à-vis p . The same applies to other logical truths.²¹

It seems pretty clear that Lynch takes logical truths, a certain type of plain truths, to be independent of any unplain truth. Presumably, though, Lynch would not take logical truths to undermine the supervenience thesis (PT^s). The reason for this is simple: necessary truths supervene on everything, because they hold true regardless of what the world is like. Thus, trivially, logical truth—classified as plain truth—supervenes on unplain truth. Many other plain truths, of course, supervene non-trivially on unplain truth: e.g., the plain truth of *'Liverpool's home colours are red, and the speeding limit in Danish cities is 50 km/hr'* supervenes on the unplain truth of the two ingredient conjuncts. The supervenience is non-trivial, because the conjunction is not true regardless of how the world is. In sum, we take it that Lynch can maintain that plain truth supervenes on unplain truth, i.e., that he can endorse (PT^s).

Where does this leave the manifestation functionalist? Supervenience, like grounding, is a kind of metaphysical dependence relation. Thus, the manifestation functionalist can say that all truths—whether plain or unplain—depend for their truth on lower-level truth-manifesting properties distinct from (immanence) truth. However, it should be emphasized that the manifestation functionalist's dependence relation is subject to a significant bifurcation. As we have seen, unplain truths depend for their truth on lower-level truth-manifesting properties in a very direct way. Their truth is strongly grounded in the possession of some lower-level truth-manifesting property. Unplain truths

²¹ This last statement should be qualified. If logical pluralism can be regarded as a natural companion of alethic pluralism (see Lynch 2009, ch. 5; Pedersen forthcoming-b), whether a compound Φ qualifies as a logical truth might not merely be a function of its logical form, but also of the subject-matter to which its constituents pertain. For example, anything of the form ' $p \vee \neg p$ ' will qualify as a logical truth provided that p belongs to a domain that conforms to classical logic, while this is not generally so for domains over which intuitionistic logic holds sway (and that include propositions that are not effectively decidable).

qualify as truths in virtue of possessing a truth-manifesting property distinct from truth itself. Plain truths are a radically different story. Their distinctive feature is precisely that they are not true in virtue of possessing some lower-level truth-manifesting property. The only truth-manifesting property they possess is truth itself. Now, if the manifestation functionalist wants to avoid accepting the alethic self-sufficiency of plain truths, she must commit to their depending for their truth on unplain truths—but in a way that is different from strong grounding. Supervenience is an option, as we have seen. However, by itself the idea that plain truth supervenes on unplain truth does not tell us too much. At most it tells us that plain truth somehow depends on unplain truth.

Dependence-as-supervenience strikes us as unclear compared to dependence-as-strong-grounding. In other words, in our view, one half of the manifestation functionalist's bifurcated metaphysics is somewhat obscure.²²

4. The priority of pluralism: the many grounding the one

Apart from strong alethic pluralism, the other views we have considered are impure or mixed: they incorporate both moderate pluralism and moderate monism. This raises an interesting question: are these views more pluralist than monist, or more monist than pluralist? Or perhaps equally so? Here, we argue that mixed pluralist views (of the kind considered) are distinctively more pluralist than monist. The previous section has provided a rationale for thinking so.²³ We first turn to alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism, then to manifestation functionalism.

²² Another very interesting proposal concerning alethic pluralism and grounding is that of Edwards (forthcoming). See Wright (forthcoming) for discussion of Edwards' proposal.

²³ The argument to be given is an extension of the kind of argument presented in Pedersen (2010), where the focus is specifically on alethic disjunctivism rather than mixed pluralist views more generally.

Recall that alethic disjunctivism incorporates the thesis that there is a generic, disjunctive truth property (T_G) that applies to all true propositions. Recall also that the view commits to the existence of a plurality of truth properties T_1, \dots, T_n . As seen in the preceding section, for any proposition p , $T_G(p)$ is always strongly grounded in $T_i(p)$ for some T_i ($1 \leq i \leq n$). That is, generic truth is always strongly grounded in domain-specific truth. A proposition is generically true because it has the truth property of the domain to which it belongs. These relations are not reversible. It is not the case that $T_i(p)$ is grounded in $T_G(p)$, and it is not the case that $T_i(p)$ obtains because $T_G(p)$. So, although $T_G(p)$ and $T_i(p)$ are biconditionally related, there is an asymmetry: $T_i(p)$ is metaphysically prior to $T_G(p)$. In other words, the domain-specific properties are more fundamental than the disjunctive property. In light of this result, we conclude that alethic disjunctivism is distinctively more pluralist than monist. What we have said just about alethic disjunctivism equally applies to second-order functionalism. The reasoning is similar, with the possession of the realizer property of the relevant domain serving to ground strongly the possession of the second-order functional truth property. As before, the lower-order properties are thus metaphysically more fundamental than the higher-order property. Hence, second-order functionalism is distinctively more pluralist than monist.

How about manifestation functionalism, the third mixed view? This view, too, is more pluralist than monist from a metaphysical point of view. Yet, the possession of the higher-order truth property is not generally as strongly grounded in lower-level truth properties as on the two other mixed views. Recall that the only truth property plain truths have is the immanent truth property, T_I . However, as also seen, plain truth supervenes on unplain truth—i.e., on some truth that is directly grounded in the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from (immanent) truth. In this sense, unplain truth and the

truth-manifesting properties are more metaphysically fundamental than the higher-level truth property.

In sum, for all three mixed views considered, the pluralist aspect of these views is more fundamental than its monism. The many ground the one.

5. On the viability of alethic disjunctivism

In this section, we support the claim made at the outset of the paper—namely, that some form of alethic disjunctivism is viable by the lights of each of the other three pluralist views considered above. It is so in the sense that it is hard for these other kinds of pluralists to deny the legitimacy of a disjunctive truth property. We make our case for this claim against the background assumption that the truth concept is characterized by a collection of core principles. As seen, this is an assumption shared by many pluralists.

5.1 *Alethic disjunctivism and strong alethic pluralism*

Recall that the strong pluralist accepts the existence of a range of domain-specific truth properties T_1, \dots, T_n . Some authors have argued that the strong pluralist can reject the legitimacy of a generic disjunctive truth property—one that takes T_1, \dots, T_n as disjuncts—on metaphysical grounds.²⁴ The basic idea behind this strategy is that the strong pluralist can think of truth properties as sparse rather than abundant properties. Here, we suggest that this is not a viable strategy.

²⁴ One such author is Pedersen (2006), who defends strong pluralism by arguing along the lines presented below.

According to the abundant conception, for any set of things, there is a property possessed by exactly the members of that set.²⁵ Thus, in particular, the following holds:

- (A_v) If there is a range of m -place properties F_1, \dots, F_n of the same order, then there is an m -place property F_v such that $F_v(a_1 \dots a_m)$ if, and only if, $F_1(a_1, \dots, a_m)$, or \dots , or $F_n(a_1, \dots, a_m)$. (*abundance*)

Instantiating (A_v) with truth properties T_1, \dots, T_n immediately delivers a disjunctive property that applies precisely to the things that possess one of T_1, \dots, T_n .

Here it might seem natural to think that viewing truth properties in a conservative manner—as being sparse rather than abundant—can be of help to the strong pluralist who wants to reject the existence of this disjunctive property. According to the sparse conception of properties, objects need to be *qualitatively similar* in order to share a property. In particular, the propositions that are supposed to possess the disjunctive truth property must be unified by a qualitative similarity. The sparse conception is thus more restrictive or conservative than the abundant conception. For this reason, if truth properties are regarded as sparse properties, the generic disjunctive property has to satisfy a substantive constraint in order to qualify as legitimate from a metaphysical point of view. As such, provided that the strong pluralist can show that the propositions that possess some domain-specific truth property fail to be unified

²⁵ The set {Anthony Soprano, aleph null, California's Lost Coast, the rise of Manicheanism} is populated with arbitrarily collected and unrelated elements spanning a wide range of metaphysical categories (e.g., fictitious persons, numbers, locations, events, etc.), and could be repopulated to include many others (e.g., tropes, moral facts, possible worlds, etc.). Subsequently, it may be that abundant theorists should restrict the scope of allowable sets; otherwise, it would appear that the only property that members of abundantly-construed sets share is (mere) set membership. Set membership is not an alethic property, however; and so neither is having the property of being a member of $\{T_1, \dots, T_n\}$.

by the requisite qualitative similarity, she will have a principled metaphysical reason to reject the generic disjunctive truth property.

Unfortunately, this line of reasoning does not look plausible given the assumption that the concept of truth is characterized by a collection of core principles (to be supplemented with principles connecting concepts with properties), and that T_1, \dots, T_n qualify as truth properties in virtue of satisfying these principles. For if the assumption holds, then satisfying the core principles is sufficient to satisfy this constraint of qualitative similarity that the generic disjunctive property has to satisfy in order to qualify as metaphysically legitimate. In light of this, it seems hard to deny the metaphysical viability of some form of alethic disjunctivism, even by the lights of the strong pluralist. The satisfaction of the core principles would appear to deliver precisely the kind of qualitative similarity that is required to make a disjunctive property like T_G metaphysically viable according to the sparse conception.

Thus, the increased degree of conservativeness that goes with this conception looks unhelpful to the strong pluralist. It does not put her in a position to rule out the legitimacy of the disjunctive truth property on metaphysical grounds.²⁶

If the strong pluralist has no means of resisting commitment to T_G , her view collapses into alethic disjunctivism. Since strong pluralism is the only pure form of pluralism, a further conclusion suggests itself: pure pluralist positions cannot be upheld by appealing to metaphysical considerations of the sort just presented. In turn, unless other defensive manoeuvres are available to fend off the

²⁶ The line of argument just presented contravenes Pedersen (2006), which presents a form of strong pluralism and tries to resist the generic, disjunctive truth property by appealing to the sparse conception of properties. Pedersen (2010) leaves the issue open. Conversations with Edwards and Lynch have convinced one author—Pedersen—that the disjunctive truth property cannot be ruled out by appealing to the sparse conception, for just these reasons. The other author—Wright—is unconvinced that the presented line of reasoning is compelling; see Wright (2011) for further details.

challenge from alethic disjunctivism, this means that the only tenable positions in the pluralist landscape are of a mixed character—ones that incorporate both moderate pluralism and moderate monism (the former because of the domain-specific truth properties T_1, \dots, T_n , the latter because of the generic disjunctive property T_G). This is a significant conclusion, as it decreases the territory that can be tenably held by the pluralist.

5.2 Alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism

It is difficult for the second-order functionalist to deny the legitimacy of some form of alethic disjunctivism. The second-order functional truth property, T_{2OF} , and the disjunctive truth property, T_G , are sufficiently similar that it would be quite odd for the second-order functionalist to endorse the existence of the former, while rejecting the existence of the latter. They are sufficiently similar in the sense of being necessarily co-extensional.

Let us start by considering the claim that T_{2OF} and T_G are co-extensional, turning afterwards to the necessity claim. Let R_1, \dots, R_n be the properties that the second-order functionalist takes to play the truth-role for domain₁, ..., domain_n. Let T_G be the property of being either R_1 (and belonging to domain₁), or ..., or R_n (and belonging to domain_n). Recall that the second-order functionalist's favored property is T_{2OF} , the property of having a property that plays the truth-role (for the relevant domain). Consider now the properties T_{2OF} and T_G . These properties are co-extensional:

(EQV) For all p , $p \in \text{ext}(T_G)$ if, and only if, $p \in \text{ext}(T_{2OF})$.

\Rightarrow Suppose that $p \in \text{ext}(T_G)$. Then, by the characterization of T_G , $R_i(p)$ and domain_i(p) for some R_i among R_1, \dots, R_n . But R_i plays the truth-

role for domain_{*i*} to which p belongs. So, p has the property of having a property that plays the truth-role for its domain. Hence, $p \in \text{ext}(T_{2OF})$.

\Leftarrow Suppose that $p \in \text{ext}(T_{2OF})$. Then p has the property R_i that plays the truth-role for domain_{*i*} to which p belongs. By the characterization of T_G , p is T_G —i.e. $p \in \text{ext}(T_G)$.

Further, note that the disjunct-disjunction relationship between, on the one hand, R_1, \dots, R_n and T_G on the other holds of necessity since being T_G is simply *defined* as being either R_1 (and belonging to domain_{*1*}), or \dots , or being R_n (and belonging to domain_{*n*}). Similarly, propositions belong to domains necessarily and each of the domain-specific properties R_1, \dots, R_n plays the truth-role relative to their respective domains necessarily. Given these necessary connections, we can strengthen the conclusion that T_{2OF} and T_G are co-extensional to the conclusion that they are co-extensional necessarily.²⁷ For familiar reasons owing to Kripke, necessary co-extension seems to be required for identity between properties. Presumably, however, it falls short of being sufficient. Yet, it does make them similar to enough suggest that it is odd to think that only T_{2OF} exists. What is needed reasonably to suppose that this is so is an independent reason for thinking that T_{2OF} exists, whereas T_G does not. Is such a reason available? We think that an independent reason that supports the opposite conclusion is available. Both T_{2OF} and T_G apply to propositions that have a property satisfying the truisms or platitudes delineating the truth concept, assuming with the second-order functionalist that the platitude-based strategy is adopted. As such, T_{2OF} and T_G apply to things that are qualitatively similar. This, in turn, makes it

²⁷ Think of the property of being an odd number divisible by 2 with 0 remainder and the property of being an integer solution to the equation $x = \sqrt{2}$. In all possible worlds these two properties have nothing in their extension, and so, they are necessarily co-extensional. Yet, they are not identical.

difficult to see why they should not both be ontologically admissible, even from the point of view of someone who occupies a conservative stance with respect to property ontology. But notice that the two properties are on a par in this regard, and so, that it would be quite odd to suppose that only one of them exists.

The above argument suggests that second-order functionalism and some form of alethic disjunctivism are notational variants, or at the very least that they are similar to some significant degree. There is convergence in two important respects. First, recall that we have proceeded on the assumption that pluralists—including alethic disjunctivists—take domain-specific truth properties to be properties that satisfy a set of core principles. But for a property to satisfy these principles relative to a given domain is for that property to play the truth-role relative to that domain, i.e. for it to have precisely the feature that the second-order functionalist takes to be distinctive of domain-specific truth properties. Second, although the disjunctive property of being R_1 (and belonging to domain₁), or ..., or being R_n (and belonging to domain_n) is intensionally different from the property of having a property satisfying the truth-role, we have just seen that there is a strong connection between these properties from an extensionally point of view: they are necessarily co-extensional. Put together these two points support the conclusion that there is a high degree of similarity between alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism. Given this high degree of similarity we submit that it would be odd for the second-order functionalist to maintain that her view is viable, while at the same time rejecting the viability of alethic disjunctivism.²⁸

²⁸ Again, we have assumed that the alethic disjunctivist we are considering embraces the idea that the core principles play a crucial concept-delineating role. However, there is nothing in principle that excludes the possibility of a form of alethic disjunctivism that does not incorporate this assumption. This kind of alethic disjunctivism would quite different from second-order functionalism, and not just because there is disagreement as to the role of the core principles.

5.3 Alethic disjunctivism and manifestation functionalism

We now turn to manifestation functionalism. Below it is argued that the manifestation functionalist cannot deny the legitimacy of the generic disjunctive truth property.

According to the manifestation functionalist, truth is the property that has the truist features as a matter of necessity—that is, ‘the property that is, necessarily, had by believed contents just when things are as they are believed to be; had by propositions believed at the end of inquiry and which makes propositions correct to believe’ (Lynch forthcoming, p. 13 in ms). As seen earlier, according to Lynch, a property must have the truist features in order to qualify as a truth property. We will now argue that the disjunctive truth property, T_G , has the truist features necessarily, and so is just like the truth property envisioned by the manifestation functionalist.

To show: T_G has the truist features necessarily, i.e.:

- (O) For all p , p is T_G if, and only if, if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. (*objectivity*)
- (NB) For all p , it is prima facie correct to believe p is T_G if, and only if, it is correct to believe p . (*norm of belief*)
- (EI) For all p , other things being equal, if p is T_G , then believing p is a worthy goal of inquiry. (*end of inquiry*)

Now recall that T_G is characterized as follows:

$$(TG) \quad (\forall p)[T_G(p) \leftrightarrow T_1(p) \vee \dots \vee T_n(p)]$$

and that

(SAT) The domain-specific truth properties T_1, \dots, T_n satisfy the truisms.

We are entitled to assume (SAT) because the manifestation functionalist takes domain-specific truth properties like correspondence and superwarrant to qualify as truth properties in virtue of satisfying the truisms.

Let us now turn to Objectivity. We break our argument into two parts, one for each direction of the biconditional:

\Rightarrow

- | | | |
|-----|--|------------|
| (1) | $T_G(p)$ | Assumption |
| (2) | If $T_G(p)$, then $T_i(p)$ (for some T_i) | (TG) |
| (3) | $T_i(p)$ | (1), (2) |
| (4) | $T_i(p)$ if, and only if, if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. | (SAT) |
| (5) | If p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. | (3), (4) |
| (6) | If $T_G(p)$, then if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. | (1), (5) |

\Leftarrow

- | | | |
|-----|---|------------|
| (1) | If p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. | Assumption |
| (2) | $T_i(p)$ if and only if, if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. | (SAT) |
| (3) | $T_i(p)$ | (2), (3) |
| (4) | $T_G(p)$ | (TG) |
| (5) | If things are believed to be as they are if p is believed, then $T_G(p)$. | (1), (4) |

Since p was arbitrary, we get the desired result by combining \Rightarrow and \Leftarrow . That is, for all p , p is T_G if, and only if, things are believed to be as they are if p is believed.

The arguments for norm of belief and end of inquiry are similar, and included in Appendix A. We get that, necessarily, T_G has the truish features (or necessarily satisfies the truisms), because we have relied only on the characterization of T_G , (SAT), and basic logical reasoning. The disjunct-disjunction relationship between T_1, \dots, T_n holds as a matter of conceptual necessity since the characterization of T_G simply says that to be T_G is to be either T_1 (and belong to domain₁), or \dots , or be T_n (and belong to domain_n). (SAT) also holds of necessity because propositions belong to domains necessarily and each of the domain-specific properties T_1, \dots, T_n plays the truth-role relative to their respective domains necessarily. These things combined imply that there is no way that T_G can fail to have the truish features.

The argument just presented shows that the disjunctive truth property T_G has the characteristic that defines truth on the manifestation functionalist view, i.e. necessary possession of the truish features. As such, the manifestation functionalist should recognize the disjunctive truth property as a legitimate truth property. It would be quite odd for her to reject the property as being illegitimate—or not a proper candidate for truth—when it passes muster by her own lights.²⁹

²⁹ Three things deserve to be mentioned. First, the conclusion that T_G satisfies the truisms and does so necessarily puts pressure on Lynch's use of the definite article in the characterization of manifestation functionalist truth. At least it does so, given his rejection of the idea that T_G is a viable candidate for functionalist truth. For a more elaborate argument against Lynch on this point, see Pedersen (forthcoming-a). Second, the argument just given can be modified so it applies in the case of the second-order functional truth property, too. See Appendix B for details. This point is highly relevant to Lynch (2009), because one of Lynch's main reasons for moving away from second-order functionalism and adopt manifestation functionalism instead is his contention that T_{20} fails to have the truish features. Third, the argument just given can be used to account for the unity of truth on the alethic disjunctivist view. One might reasonably wonder what unifies the domain-specific—or disjunct—truth properties T_1, \dots, T_n . For instance, just like Lynch worries whether the second-order functionalist property has the truish features, one might wonder whether T_G really has these features. We take ourselves to have shown that T_G does indeed have these features. This puts the alethic disjunctivist in a position to answer the question of unity: truths have something substantial in common. They all have a property that, necessarily, has the truish features.

6 Conclusion

We have pursued and executed a number of tasks in this paper. First, we have provided a survey of much of the pluralist landscape. We take it that the distinctions between moderate and strong versions of monism and pluralism, respectively, exhaust logical space. However, we also take it that the four specific varieties of pluralism discussed here do not exhaust the pluralist part of that space; conspicuously absent, for example, are the views of Sher, Horgan et al., and other correspondence pluralists. Still, the four varieties surveyed should be of particular interest in that they are prominent in the pluralist literature. Second, we hope to have illuminated the three mixed pluralist views—alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism—by discussing the idea of metaphysical grounding that is an integral part of each of them. Although they all incorporate a monist thesis, as the discussion made clear, they are distinctively more pluralist than monist from a metaphysical point of view. Again, to use a slogan: the many ground the one. We also hope to have made a case for thinking that alethic disjunctivism is relatively compelling—that the three other kinds of pluralist will find it hard to reject the viability of the view. For the strong pluralist, the generic disjunctive truth property suggests itself, because it should be admitted into the ontology even by conservative standards with respect to property ontology.³⁰ It will be difficult for the second-order functionalist to resist alethic disjunctivism, because her favored truth property and the disjunctive truth property turn out to be quite similar. Lastly, the disjunctive truth property has the truish features as a matter of necessity—which on the manifestation functionalist view is the key characteristic of truth.

³⁰ These considerations leave other arguments for strong pluralism untouched, however. See, e.g., Wright (2010, forthcoming) and Cotnoir (forthcoming).

Appendix A: T_G satisfies Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry

Norm of Belief:

\Rightarrow

- | | | |
|-----|---|------------|
| (1) | $T_G(p)$ | Assumption |
| (2) | If $T_G(p)$, then $T_i(p)$ (for some T_i) | (TG) |
| (3) | $T_i(p)$ | (1), (2) |
| (4) | $T_i(p)$ if and only if it is correct to believe that p | (SAT) |
| (5) | It is correct to believe that p | (3), (4) |
| (6) | If $T_G(p)$, then it is correct to believe that p | (1), (5) |

\Leftarrow

- | | | |
|-----|---|------------|
| (1) | It is correct to believe that p | Assumption |
| (2) | $T_i(p)$ if and only if it is correct to believe that p | (SAT) |
| (3) | $T_i(p)$ | (1), (2) |
| (4) | $T_G(p)$ | (TG) |
| (5) | If it is correct to believe that p , then $T_G(p)$ | (1), (4) |

Proposition p was arbitrary. Thus, putting together \Rightarrow and \Leftarrow , we get that T_G satisfies Norm of Belief: for all p , p is T_G if and only if it is correct to believe p .

End of Inquiry:

- | | | |
|-----|--|------------|
| (1) | $T_G(p)$ | Assumption |
| (2) | If $T_G(p)$, then $T_i(p)$ (for some T_i) | (TG) |
| (3) | $T_i(p)$ | (1), (2) |
| (4) | If $T_i(p)$, then believing p is a worthy goal of inquiry | (SAT) |
| (5) | Believing p is a worthy goal of inquiry. | (3), (4) |
| (6) | If $T_G(p)$, then believing p is a worthy goal of inquiry | (1), (5) |

Proposition p was arbitrary. Therefore, for all p , if $T_G(p)$, then believing p is a worthy goal of inquiry.

Appendix B: T_{20} satisfies the truisms

The truth property of second-order functionalism, T_{20} , is characterized as follows:

(T²⁰) The property of being true (T_{20}) is the property of having a property that plays the truth-role (relative to the relevant domain),

Furthermore, it is an integral part of the view that

(SAT²⁰) A property plays the truth-role for domain, if it has the truth features for every proposition belonging to that domain.

Given (T²⁰) and (SAT²⁰), we can straightforwardly modify the argument provided in the case of T_G to show that T_{20} satisfies Objectivity:

⇒

- | | | |
|-----|--|--------------------------------------|
| (1) | $T_{20}(p)$ | Assumption |
| (2) | If $T_{20}(p)$, then $T_i(p)$ | (for some T_i) (T ²⁰) |
| (3) | $T_i(p)$ | (1), (2) |
| (4) | $T_i(p)$ if and only if (if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are). | (SAT ²⁰) |
| (5) | If p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. | (3), (4) |
| (6) | If $T_{20}(p)$, then (if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are). | (1), (5) |

←

- | | | |
|-----|---|----------------------|
| (1) | If p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. | Assumption |
| (2) | $T_i(p)$ if and only if, if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are. | (SAT ²⁰) |
| (3) | $T_i(p)$ | (2), (3) |
| (4) | $T_{20}(p)$ | (TG) |
| (5) | If (if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are), then $T_{20}(p)$. | (1), (4) |

Proposition p was arbitrary. So, by combining \Rightarrow and \Leftarrow we get the desired result: for all p , p is T_{20} if and only if (if p is believed, things are believed to be as they are). The arguments for Norm of Belief and End of Inquiry can likewise be obtained by straightforwardly modifying the arguments provided for T_G .

One of Lynch's main reasons for moving away from second-order functionalism and adopt manifestation functionalism instead is that he takes T_{20} not to have the truth features (2009, pp. 64–6). As such, in his view, it fails to be a truth property properly so-called. The argument we have just provided suggests that Lynch has concluded too swiftly that the truth property of second-order functionalism fails in this respect (even if it fails in others—see Wright, 2010).

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